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EU Emissions Trading: Policy-Induced Innovation, or Business as Usual? 
Findings from Company Case Studies in the Republic of Croatia 
 
Abstract 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), while primarily designed to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in an effective and efficient way, is supposed to serve as an 
instrument promoting investments in clean, low-carbon technologies by way of incentivizing 
associated innovation activity. Since empirical results concerning the instrument´s capacity of 
reaching this secondary policy goal are rare, this paper examines the innovation impact of the 
EU ETS among emissions-intensive companies in the Republic of Croatia. To this end the 
effects of the instrument on research, development and demonstration (RD&D), adoption, and 
organizational change are examined. The study accounts for the impacts of various context 
factors, including firm-external and firm-internal variables. The empirical analysis employs a 
multiple case study approach. While findings support the assertion that policy-induced 
innovation effects arise from the pricing of carbon, the innovation-fostering capacity of the 
instrument remains limited due to continued low levels of policy stringency and predictability. 
Long-term expectations of market actors appear to play a decisive role in decisions 
surrounding innovation activity, suggesting that signals of policy commitment are highly 
influential.  
 
Keywords: European Union, emissions trading, Croatia, carbon, climate policy 
JEL classification: O31, Q58 
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Trgovina emisijama u Europskoj uniji: Potiču li klimatske politike inovacije? 
Studija slučaja hrvatskih poduzeća 
 
Sažetak 
Program trgovanja emisijskim jedinicama u Europskoj uniji (EU ETS), iako je razvijen 
prvenstveno s ciljem efektivnog i efikasnog smanjenja emisije stakleničkih plinova, koristi se 
kao alat kojim se potiču investicije u ekološki čiste tehnologije s niskim emisijama ugljičnog 
dioksida, promicanjem srodnih inovacijskih aktivnosti. Budući da postoje rijetki empirijski 
podaci o uspješnosti ovog alata u postizanju tog sekundarnog cilja, ovim se radom istražuje 
utjecaj programa EU ETS na inovacije u hrvatskim poduzećima s velikim emisijama 
stakleničkih plinova. Analiziraju se učinci ovog alata na aktivnosti istraživanja, razvoja i 
demonstracije (RD&D), usvajanja tehnologija i organizacijske promjene. Istraživanje uzima u 
obzir razne kontekstualne faktore koji utječu interno i eksterno na poduzeće, odnosno interne i 
vanjske varijable. Empirijska analiza provodi se metodom višestruke studije slučaja. Dok 
rezultati potvrđuju da na inovacijski učinak utječe cijena ugljika, učinak u smislu promicanja 
inovacija ostaje ograničen zbog nedovoljno strogih i predvidljivih politika. Dugoročna 
očekivanja sudionika na tržištu igraju veliku ulogu kod donošenja odluka o inovacijskim 
aktivnostima, što sugerira da je dosljednost u provođenju politika od velike važnosti. 
 
Ključne riječi: Europska unija, trgovanje emisijama, Hrvatska, ugljik, klimatska politika 
JEL klasifikacija: O31, Q58 
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1. Introduction1 
In recent decades, the political appreciation for concerted efforts to reduce man-made 
pollution in order to curb climate change has grown significantly (UNFCCC, 1992). This 
tendency can be observed in the global efforts to determine climate action beyond the Kyoto 
Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997), in the realization of several policies aimed at increased 
environmental sustainability across a substantial number of countries (IEA, 2009), and not 
least in the recent Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), which as of now has been ratified by 
145 parties, effectively surpassing the necessary threshold for its implementation.2  
One major development in international climate action was the consideration of emissions 
trading as an effective vehicle in tackling excessive emissions levels (UNFCCC, 1997). 
Despite initial skepticism3 towards emissions trading (Christiansen & Wettestad, 2003), the 
European Union (EU) has emerged as a frontrunner in terms of establishing a market for 
emissions (ibid.). In 2003 the EU established its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) via 
Directive 2003/87/EC (from here on the Directive). In 2005 the instrument launched. It holds 
the title for the world´s largest emissions trading program4 spanning the 28 EU member states, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, covering over 12,000 installations and 1,300 airline 
operators5, responsible for approximately 45 percent of the Union´s total annual greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions6. Its hitherto 12-year period of operation has been divided into three 
phases, with its fourth phase commencing in 2021. Each successive phase has brought about 
more or less significant changes, with its current phase generally being regarded as the most 
stringent yet.  
According to Article 1 of the Directive, the primary policy goal of the EU ETS is “to promote 
reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient 
manner”. However, the scheme also aims at promoting “investments in clean, low-carbon 
technologies”7 and incentivizing associated innovation activity (EU, 2005). The crucial 
                                                            
1 This work is part of the master´s thesis “EU Emissions Trading: Policy-Induced Innovation, or Business as 
Usual? Findings from Company Case Studies in the Republic of Croatia” which was conducted within the study 
program of “European Governance”. As a guest researcher, author Martin Larsson carried out this research at the 
Institute of Economics, Zagreb during the period between March 1, 2017 and June 30, 2017. 
2 UNFCCC (2017, May 8). “Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification”. Retrieved from 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (10.05.2017). 
3 Christiansen and Wettestad (2003) provide a comprehensive analysis of this topic. 
4 EU (2017, May 8). “The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)”. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013_en (10.05.2017). 
5 EEA (2017, May 4). “EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) data Viewer”. Retrieved from 
https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/data/data-viewers/emissions-trading-viewer-1 (15.05.2017). 
6 Supra, note 3. 
7 Supra, note 3. 
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importance of the development, demonstration and adoption of state-of-the-art low-carbon 
technologies has been acknowledged by several authors (IPCC, 2007; Kneese & Schultze, 
1975; Orr, 1976; Stern, 2006) claiming that the provision of incentives for such measures 
should be considered a crucial component of environmental policy, if sharp decreases in 
emissions levels are to be achieved, with Kneese and Schultze (1975, p. 82) positing that: 
“Over the long haul, perhaps the single most important criterion to judge environmental 
policies is the extent to which they spur new technology towards the efficient conservation of 
environmental quality.” 
Therefore, this research seeks to shed light on whether such innovation-inducing effects are in 
fact observable, what role the design features of the EU ETS play in achieving such effects, 
how the respective mechanisms associated with the EU ETS influence innovation activity, 
and what type of innovations are most likely to emerge. The research seeks to contribute to 
the empirical literature by offering insights into the innovation impacts of the EU ETS during 
its current trading phase, and focuses on the Republic of Croatia, which did not join the EU 
ETS until its third phase was in effect. 
In order to answer the research questions this work takes the following approach: section 2 
will highlight the analytical fundamentals of environmental policy´s nexus with technological 
change, and provide detailed insights into the specific policy instrument under investigation, 
including its most significant reformations over time. It also entails an extensive review of the 
available literature on links between environmental regulation and innovation, and briefly 
revisits the relevance of this research by identifying the current limits of that literature and 
potential gaps therein. Section 3 introduces the theoretical focus of this study by delineating 
and explaining the fundamentals of environmental economics and the economics of 
technological change, which constitute the very foundation of this thesis. Based on the review 
of the theoretical underpinnings, a reliable research framework guiding the empirical 
component of this work will be constructed. Section 4 addresses the methodological approach 
chosen for the empirical investigation of the issue at hand by explaining choices relating to 
the research design, including the justification of a multiple case study design, the underlying 
reasoning for the specific selection of cases, as well as the choice of data collection and data 
analysis methods and techniques. This section concludes by addressing concerns related to the 
validity and reliability of this study, and by presenting some of the difficulties experienced 
during the conduct of this work. The study´s findings are presented in section 5, including the 
discussion of relative influences of explanatory variables. Section 6 concludes the work, and 
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includes implications for society and academia, policy recommendations and 
recommendations for potential future research.  
 
2. Background 
2.1. Analytical Fundamentals 
Environmental economics, and by extension the evaluation of environmental policy, is mainly 
concerned with the idea of externalities. The concept refers to environmentally harmful 
consequences of economic activity, negative externalities, imposing costs, which at least 
partially are being borne by another party than the one responsible for the creation thereof 
(Jaffe et al., 2005). Due to the circumstance that the polluter does not bear the cost associated 
with pollution, there are no economic incentives to minimize it, causing underinvestment in 
abatement technology (Popp, 2010), and thus an oversupply of pollution. Environmental 
policy attempts to increase these incentives, either via the internalization of the environmental 
cost by way of market-based policy instruments, such as emissions trading or emissions taxes, 
or via so-called command and control instruments, such as emissions standards or prescribed 
technologies or processes (ibid.). 
A substantial body of theoretical literature has attempted to rank these different policy 
instruments with respect to their capacities of providing such incentives8. Downing and White 
(1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989) provided the basis for further attempts in this 
direction by the likes of Jung et al. (1996) amongst others (Gagelmann & Frondel, 2005). 
These early studies can be credited with the emergence of a long-held belief that market-
based policy instruments are generally superior to direct regulation regarding their abilities to 
induce technological change, with auctioned permits seemingly providing the largest 
incentives (Milliman & Prince, 1989; Jung et al. 1996). However, later studies not only 
challenged the notion that market-based instruments provide superior innovation incentives to 
conventional command and control policies (Montero, 2002; Fischer et al., 2003), but also the 
superiority of permit trading within the category of market-based instruments (Keohane, 
1999; Schwarze, 2001; Requate & Unold, 2003). It is, however, to be kept in mind that the 
underlying assumptions of the models used to arrive at these conclusions are as diverse as 
their results.  
                                                            
8 For a comprehensive review see Requate (2005). 
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Although environmental externalities are prominently featured throughout environmental 
economics, and pose an intuitive starting point for the examination of lacking pollution 
control incentives, technological change with a view to eco-innovation is characterized by 
what has been referred to as the double externality problem (Rennings, 2000; Jaffe et al., 
2005).  
The economics of technology suggest that technological change suffers from so-called 
knowledge externalities (Griliches, 1992; Jaffe et al., 2003; Jaffe et al., 2005). While pollution 
is considered a negative externality, causing the market to overproduce it, technology on the 
other hand poses a positive externality, causing the market to underproduce it. Investments in 
new technology tend to be a costly exercise, a fact overlooked by the static models referred to 
above. These costs are typically borne by the respective firm, while the benefits created can 
be reaped by others. This is due to the public-good qualities of novel knowledge. Although 
patents and some other institutions can serve a protecting function in terms of the dispersion 
of the benefits derived from investments in innovation, such protection is characterized as 
inherently imperfect by Jaffe et al. (2005, p. 167).  
The double-externality remains at the core of deliberations concerning technology policies in 
the environmental domain. However, Jaffe et al. (2005) note that further market failures, 
concerning the adoption of new technologies and information inefficiencies, have entered the 
debate as of late. Despite its brevity, this introduction shows that markets tend to undersupply 
eco-innovation, and supports claims that environmental policies need to be geared towards 
fostering innovation. Furthermore, the intersection of market failures located at the nexus of 
environmental and technology economics solidifies the case for an integrated approach to the 
analysis of environmental policy, as furthered by Rennings (2000) and Jaffe et al. (2005).  
The following sub-sections will provide some background information on emissions trading 
in general, the EU ETS specifically, and a review of the literature investigating the policy 
instruments performance with a view to innovation, before the succeeding sections will return 
to the theoretical focus of this study in greater detail.  
 
2.2. Emissions Trading and the EU ETS 
The concept of emissions trading emerged via Ronald Coase´s (1960) seminal work on social 
costs, which advocated the introduction of property rights to the debate surrounding 
environmental regulation, and laid the groundwork for escaping a lasting impasse caused by a 
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fundamental disagreement between policy makers and economists (Tietenberg, 2006) 
regarding the approach to the overexploitation of common goods (Olstrom et al., 2002), such 
as our atmosphere. By letting markets play a more central role in the valuation of common 
goods, disadvantages associated with both command-and-control as well as taxation 
approaches to environmental regulation could be overcome in a cost-effective manner 
(Tietenberg, 2006). Dales (1968) later refined Coase´s (1960) approach, and is commonly 
credited with the development of emissions trading as we know it today.  
Generally, emissions trading schemes involve limiting the collective emissions of a 
predefined population of emitters by setting a reduction target as compared to a chosen 
baseline. Covered emitters are then allocated a fraction of the collective total of emissions 
rights, also called allowances, which provide the right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide9 
(CO2). The allocation process generally takes the form of either freely allocated allowances, 
based on historic emission levels, or the acquisition of allowances takes place via auctioning. 
The collective emissions limit, or cap, is gradually reduced over time in order to achieve an 
overall reduction in emissions. The regulated entities then choose from a set of coping 
strategies. If individual emissions do not exceed the held allowances, excess allowances can 
be sold on the market. Conversely, if individual emissions exceed held allowances, additional 
ones can be bought. Companies with relatively low abatement costs will, based on a cost-
savings rationale, reduce their emissions, while others, that face higher abatement costs, will 
choose to acquire additional allowances. Over the long run, the incentives to reduce emissions 
will increase due to increased allowance prices stemming from the continuous reduction of 
the cap. 
The EU ETS, which lies at the core of this research, represents the world´s largest emissions 
trading scheme, and constitutes the most important example of tackling climate change issues 
via market-based policy instruments to date (Ellerman, Marcantonini & Zaklan, 2016). The 
scheme can be categorized as a classic cap-and-trade system (ibid.), as outlined above. 
However, its large dimensions regarding its geographic scope, the amount of covered 
installations and emissions sources, as well as its multinational nature contribute to its 
uniqueness. While its emergence can be considered somewhat of a surprise considering initial 
reservations of the EU towards emissions trading10, the system has now been operational 
since 2005, covering almost half of the EU´s total GHG emissions. Its operation has been 
                                                            
9 In case of other greenhouse gases, allowances cover one ton of CO2-equivalent. That is the amount of any 
given GHG, with the same global warming potential (GWP) as one ton of CO2 over 100 years.  
10 Supra, note 2. 
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divided into three phases, each of which has introduced more or less radical changes in the 
instrument´s design features, which as will be illuminated later, have significant implications 
for its impact on technological change.  
During the EU ETS´s first phase, spanning three years between 2005 and 2007, only CO2 
emissions from a very limited number of sectors were covered. Grandfathering, the 
distribution of emissions allowances free of charge, was by far the dominant allocation 
mechanism11. During this phase the national governments of participating states played the 
central role in determining the overall cap, as each member issued a National Allocation Plan 
(NAP). These plans in turn were mostly based on loose estimates, accounted for by the 
scarcity of reliable emissions data12. Initially, the European Commission had aimed at a total 
number of allowances short of so-called business-as-usual projections by requiring members 
to present NAPs, which signaled a credible commitment to reduction targets derived from the 
Kyoto Protocol (Wråke, Burtraw, Löfgren & Zetterberg, 2012). However, many members 
grossly overstated their needs for emissions allowances, contributing to widespread critique 
against the NAP procedure, as it was considered the driving force behind windfall profits in 
the electricity sector and distortionary effects on competition (Ellerman et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the overallocation of allowances provoked allowance prices to hit zero in 
200713, adding to the legitimacy of claims that the system was far too lax, consequently 
providing weak incentives for emissions reduction. However, this first phase was branded a 
pilot phase of “learning-by-doing” as a form of preparation for successive phases, and 
succeeded in establishing a carbon price as well as a marketplace for allowances within the 
EU, and allowed for the development of the necessary infrastructure in relation to monitoring, 
reporting and verification tasks.14 
Although the second phase of the EU ETS, covering five years between 2008 and 2012, 
retained the NAP approach and reduced the share of freely allocated allowances by only 5 
percentage points, from 95 percent to 90 percent (Ellerman et al., 2016), a number of 
important changes took place. Apart from the inclusion of nitrous oxide emissions, and the 
accession of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway to the program15, concerns about the 
credibility of the EU ETS, based primarily on a potential reinforcement of extremely low 
allowance prices due to continued overallocation (Wråke et al., 2012), were met with a 
                                                            
11 EU (12 May 2017). “Phase 1 and 2 (2005-2012)”. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/pre2013_en (16.05.2017). 
12 Supra, Note 10. 
13 Supra, Note 10. 
14 Supra, Note 10. 
15 Supra, Note 10. 
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comparatively drastic cap reduction by 6.5 percent compared to 200516 as well as tightened 
criteria for the approval of NAPs by the Commission (Wråke et al., 2012). Despite these 
efforts, the economic crisis of 2008 caused emissions levels to decrease beyond predictions, 
yet again causing an oversupply of allowances, which according to the EU17 suppressed 
carbon prices throughout the phase. Nevertheless, Wråke et al. (2012) note that improvements 
in the availability and reliability of information surrounding emissions and allocation 
contributed to increased allowance price stability throughout that period, as compared to the 
rather high levels of volatility in the preceding phase. 
The third phase of the scheme, which commenced in 2013 and will last until 2020, is the 
focus of attention of this work. This phase coincides with the accession of the Republic of 
Croatia to the EU, which took place in July 2013, and automatically made the country part of 
the EU ETS. Simultaneously this phase entails the most drastic and significant changes to the 
scheme thus far (Ellerman et al., 2016). For one, the phase covers eight years, constituting the 
hitherto longest phase, which in turn can be expected to have implications for regulatory 
uncertainty (Engau & Hoffmann, 2009). Secondly, the list of included GHGs was extended, 
while several new sectors were included in the system18. The most significant changes stem 
from harmonization efforts, which were informed by the lessons drawn from the preceding 
phases19. These efforts include the choice of auctioning as the default mode of allowance 
allocation20, with approximately 50 percent of allowances now being auctioned (Ellerman et 
al., 2016), as compared to 5 percent and 10 percent in earlier phases (ibid.), while rules for the 
free allocation of allowances have been harmonized across the participating states (Wråke et 
al., 2012). The most fundamental reform, however, is the determination of the cap at the 
central EU level, doing away with the NAP approach (ibid.). This can be considered a 
decisive step in avoiding what Wråke et al. (2012) refer to as a “race to the bottom” in the 
form of substantial overallocation, characteristic of the first two EU ETS phases. 
Additionally, the cap is set to be linearly reduced by 1.74 percent annually (Ellerman et al., 
2016). 
                                                            
16 As the pilot phase had provided data on actual emissions levels, the cap reduction during phase two 
corresponded to more precise numbers as compared to the initial estimates; Supra, Note 10. 
17 Supra, Note 10. 
18 EU (12 May 2017). “The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)”. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en (16.05.2017). 
19 EU (12 May 2017). “The EU ETS Handbook”. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/docs/ets_handbook_en.pdf (16.05.2017). 
20 Supra, Note 17. 
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This recap of the development of the EU ETS goes to show that its rules and design features, 
which have been identified as important influences on innovation (Kemp & Pontoglia, 2008; 
Vollebergh, 2007), have changed quite drastically since the EU ETS´s inception. The 
circumstance that the Republic of Croatia did not join the scheme until increased 
harmonization had bolstered its stringency, as compared to earlier phases, makes it a unique 
case in the sense that regulated entities did not experience phases of vast overallocation of 
allowances and the associated windfall profits. On the other hand, the frequent changes in 
legislation contribute to perceived low levels of predictability associated with the instrument; 
a feature previously identified as decisive in shaping corporate strategy (Engau & Hoffmann, 
2009; Hoffmann, Trautmann & Schneider, 2008). The following sub-section will review the 
available literature on the EU ETS´s impact on technological change, and identify the need for 
further research, especially during this third phase of the EU ETS.  
 
2.3.  Literature Review 
The empirical literature on the innovation-inducing effects of the EU ETS can be 
distinguished into two sub-categories. Firstly, a few ex-ante studies have attempted to predict 
the EU ETS´s impact on technological change based on its initial design. Secondly, numerous 
ex-post studies have been conducted, evaluating this impact both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. This sub-section will offer a review of these studies, address potential 
shortcomings, and return to the relevance of this study by identifying gaps and omissions.  
Seminal work in the former category includes a study conducted by Gagelmann and Frondel 
(2005), who review the theoretical literature on environmental policies, specifically permit 
trading, and evaluate the available empirical evidence on innovation effects of three US 
trading schemes. They arrive at the conclusion that the EU ETS is likely to have limited 
innovation-inducing effects in its initial phase, mostly due to the generous allocation of 
allowances, as pointed out above. Similarly, Schleich and Betz (2005) predict only modest 
innovation incentives, mainly due to generous allocation approaches and the associated low 
cost of compliance. Additionally, they point out that regulatory uncertainty, stemming from 
unspecified future rules, further hampers technology investments. Both studies predict low-
risk and low-cost strategies, such as fuel substitution, to be the dominant coping strategies, 
rather than change in the form of more drastic product or process innovations. Furthermore, in 
an analysis of NAPs paired with a simulation game, Ehrhart, Hoppe, Schleich and Seifert 
(2005) find that the scheme will likely fail to live up to its theoretically ascribed cost-
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efficiency. In line with the previous studies, they identify the generosity in allocation as a 
main reason for this, and point out that these flaws in the scheme´s initial design inhibit well-
founded investment decisions with a view to emissions abatement. As will be shown 
throughout the following paragraphs, these predictions turned out accurate; however, it is to 
be kept in mind that these studies base their predictions on the design of the first phase, which 
as was shown in the preceding sub-section, has changed to a large extent. Both acknowledge 
that tightened stringency and the expected changes in legislation would have the potential to 
increase the innovation-inducing capacities of the instrument.  
Turning to the empirical ex-post examination of the EU ETS´s innovation effects, the bulk of 
the available literature is located during the first trading phase. In line with predictions from 
Gagelman and Frondel (2005) and Schleich and Betz (2005), Hoffmann (2007), conducting 
case studies in the German electricity sector, finds that although the EU ETS can be 
considered a driver of small-scale, low-risk investments, its impact on large projects and 
research and development efforts is in fact limited. Hoffmann (2007) attributes this to a lack 
of cap-stringency and regulatory uncertainty, further confirming ex-ante predictions. 
Contrastingly, in a qualitative study of sectoral innovation systems in the power generation 
sector, Hoffmann and Rogge (2010) find that the EU ETS has primarily impacted large-scale 
power generation technology. Although the authors confine these results to coal-based power 
generation, the contrast to earlier findings remains interesting. Pontoglio (2008, p. 18) reaches 
very similar conclusions to Hoffmann (2007) in the course of a case study of the Italian paper 
industry, characterizing the EU ETS as “a system scarcely favorable to innovations”. These 
findings are largely mirrored in a mixed methods study of the German pulp and paper industry 
conducted by Rogge et al. (2011a). Löfgren, Wråke, Hagberg and Roth (2013) choose a 
quantitative approach, and examine firm-level data from Swedish enterprises covering the 
years 2002 to 2008. Examining the data, Löfgren et al. (2013) add to earlier findings pointing 
to significant limitations in influence on investment and innovation. Despite their 
discouraging conclusions, all authors acknowledge the potential to improve the efficacy of the 
EU ETS in incentivizing technological change based on the announced efforts to alter 
allocation processes and to tackle the overallocation of allowances, thereby increasing 
instrument stringency. 
Conversely, Calel and Dechelzepretre (2012), who take a quantitative approach in examining 
the patenting activity of several thousand companies, find a distinct increase in low-carbon 
innovation among companies covered by the EU ETS within its first five years of operation. 
The authors, however, acknowledge that patents are not necessarily capturing all aspects of 
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innovation, such as operational, organizational and strategic changes, and that difficulties in 
isolating the EU ETS´s effect were present. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the findings 
represent a sharp contrast to earlier studies, maybe best captured by the statement that the EU 
ETS´s impact on regulated firms “may in fact be quite large, even … where permits in the 
initial trading phases were very likely overallocated” (Calel & Dechelzepretre, 2012, p. 189).  
Schmidt et al. (2012) examine survey data from about 200 power generators and technology 
providers across seven countries. This study is similar to Calel and Dechelzepretre (2012) in 
that the compared timeframes are identical, and a quantitative approach was chosen. Schmidt 
et al. (2012), however, arrive at contrasting results, identifying limited or even controversial 
effects of the policy instrument on technological change. Yet again these shortcomings are 
attributed to a lack of stringency.  
Lastly, both Cames (2010) and Rogge et al. (2011) find evidence of a limited impact of the 
EU ETS on innovation, attributed to a lack of stringency and predictability. While Rogge et 
al. (2011) suggest that the EU ETS appears to be an insufficient instrument for incentivizing 
innovation and should be complemented by additional policies specifically aimed at 
innovation incentives, they do also acknowledge that the expected revisions would enhance 
the regulatory pull effect of the instrument. This is a notion supported also by Cames (2010).  
Not only does this review show that empirical investigation of the EU ETS´s capacity to 
induce low-carbon technological change is scarce, and inconclusive at best, but that the clear 
majority of the conducted studies rely on data from the first trading phase, which, as was 
identified earlier, constituted a low-stringency pilot phase. Considering the revisions 
undertaken within the past ten years, and bearing in mind that these revisions correspond to 
the recommendations furthered by several authors, it appears reasonable to expect an altered 
impact on technological change. Furthermore, a substantial share of early studies fail to take 
into consideration an array of related variables, including firm-internal characteristics and 
firm-external influences (Del Rio Gonzalez, 2009), the relevance of which will be discussed 
in the following section.  
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3. Theoretical Focus 
The theoretical literature surrounding technological progress is vast, and a plethora of 
approaches have been employed to analyze the underlying processes. This study, however, 
will focus on only a few theories, which have specific relevance for the task of orienting 
technological advances. The employed theories and analytical approaches are, as stated by 
Del Rio Gonzalez (2009, p. 863), “not mutually incompatible and should be combined” in 
efforts to capture the complexities of environmental technological change.  
The examined theories can be said to sharply contrast a large fraction of traditional economic 
theory in that technological change is treated endogenously. Viewing technological change as 
an exogenous variable, as mainstream economics tend to, makes it immune to the influences 
of economic activities and policy. Such approaches focus on depicting the effects of 
technological change but, by design, ignore the processes which contribute to its occurrence, 
and thereby can be deemed unfit for the exercise of determining the extent to which public 
policy induces such change.  
The emergence of what Jaffe et al. (2003) refer to as the modern theory of technological 
change is associated with the process of creative destruction, a term coined by Josef 
Schumpeter (1942), who viewed innovation as the fundamental component of the modern 
capitalist system. The process, which describes the introduction of superior products or 
processes, motivated by the desire to increase market power and gain excess profits, is 
characterized by the three distinct stages of invention, innovation and diffusion. Invention 
involves a scientific or technological advance novel to the world, while innovation describes 
the establishment of an invention as a commercially feasible and marketable product or 
process. However, an innovator does not necessarily have to invent, as the identification of 
previously non-commercialized ideas and their consecutive introduction to the market suffice 
to be an innovator. These two initial stages are, according to Jaffe et al. (2003), mostly carried 
out in private firms, and often summarized under the term research and development (R&D). 
The final stage – diffusion – describes the adoption and application of a successful innovation 
by a wider audience. Collectively these stages are commonly referred to as technological 
change.  
Building on Schumpeter, a large body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, emerged, 
treating innovation “as a purposive economic activity”, attempting to “discern its 
determinants and effects” (Jaffe et al., 2003, p. 469). Within the literature on the determinants 
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of technological change, two major sub-categories can be identified, one of them being the 
induced innovation approach.  
 
3.1.  Induced Innovation 
Induced innovation, first furthered as a hypothesis by Sir John Hicks (1932, p. 124), is 
centered around the premise that the rate and direction of innovation are responsive to 
variations in relative prices of factors of production21. With a view to environmental policy, 
Jaffe et al. (2003, p. 469-470) posit that “since environmental policy implicitly or explicitly 
makes environmental inputs more expensive, the induced innovation hypothesis suggests an 
important pathway for the interaction of environmental policy and technology, and for the 
introduction of impacts on technological change as a criterion for evaluation of different 
policy instruments”.  
Hicks himself did not formalize the link between his hypothesis and the process of 
technological change, a task which was accomplished in the 1960s (Ahmad, 1966; Kamien & 
Schwartz, 1968) and later refined by Binswanger (1974)22. The induced innovation approach 
views R&D as an investment aimed at the creation of novel and profitable products and/or 
processes. Consequently, decisions concerning such investments are subject to firms´ desires 
to maximize their value, making the cost of R&D as well as expected rates of return decisive 
factors. Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties and challenges of testing the hypothesis 
(Cames, 2010; Jaffe et al., 2003), evidence of the inducement of innovation is relatively 
ample23, suggesting that changes in relative prices indeed exert influence on the investment 
decisions of firms and thereby lending support to the assertion that policies which induce 
price adjustments can foster innovation.  
In the course of induced innovation research, theory and evidence have suggested that several 
factors are important in determining the optimal levels of R&D (Jaffe et al., 2003). These 
studies include the works of Schmookler (1966) and Rosenberg (1974), who are most 
commonly referred to when speaking of the concepts of supply-push (or technology-push) 
and demand-pull (or market-pull), which have dominated the debate in innovation economics 
(Rennings, 2000). In relation to eco-innovation, technology-push emphasizes the influence of 
                                                            
21 As Hicks´s hypothesis materialized before Schumpeter´s creative destruction, his use of the term “invention” 
should be interpreted in a more general way, including the notions of both invention and innovation.  
22 For an exhaustive account of this literature see Binswanger & Ruttan (1978). 
23 For a detailed summary of empirical studies concerning pollution abatement and energy conservation 
innovation see Jaffe et al. (2003, p. 474-476). 
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scientific advances on the rate and direction of innovation, while the demand-pull argument 
focuses on market factors such as consumers´ preferences for environmentally friendly 
products or increased competitiveness of firms with an environmentally friendly image (ibid.). 
Empirical evidence has shown that both arguments are relevant (Pavitt, 1984). However, 
several externalities are at play when it comes to eco-innovation, causing a situation to arise 
in which the factors of technology-push and market-pull are insufficient to trigger 
technological change.  
As acknowledged in section 2.1, eco-innovation is characterized by the double externality 
problem24. On the one hand, environmental externalities, such as pollution, are being 
oversupplied by the market as the costs of pollution are being borne by other parties than the 
polluters, causing a situation in which the polluters face no incentive to reduce their 
environmentally harmful impact. Simultaneously, investments in eco-friendly products or 
processes are being hampered by knowledge externalities, which create a reversed situation in 
which the benefits of technological progress are being enjoyed by other parties than the ones 
incurring the costs thereof, effectively reducing incentives to invest even further. Economists 
(Jaffe, 1986; Jones & Williams, 1998; Mansfield, 1977) have found that these spillover 
effects cause a discrepancy between private and social rates of return, with social rates of 
return outweighing the private rates of return previously identified as decisive in the 
investment decisions of firms, ultimately leading to socially desirable investments in R&D 
being ignored. R&D efforts are, however, not the only component of technological change 
suffering from externalities. Jaffe et al. (2005) argue that the adoption and diffusion of novel 
technology can be hampered via dynamic increasing returns, a term which describes the 
phenomenon that users of technology will benefit from a larger population using the same 
technology (Berndt & Pindyck, 2000). Dynamic increasing returns arise in different ways. 
“Learning-by-using” describes a situation in which the adopter of a new technology creates a 
positive externality for other potential users by generating additional knowledge about that 
technology´s existence, characteristics and potential superiority (Jaffe et al., 2005). 
“Learning-by-doing” describes an additional adoption externality related to the circumstance 
that a user of novel technology can, over time, become experienced enough in the use of said 
technology to decrease production costs. If this additional experience spills over, other 
manufacturers may benefit (ibid.). Lastly, both the innovation and consecutive diffusion of 
new technologies suffer from information-related market failures, which go beyond the ones 
                                                            
24 For an exhaustive account of the market failures permeating eco-innovation see Jaffe, Newell & Stavins 
(2005).  
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just examined (ibid.). Investments in innovation and technology are generally characterized 
by particularly pronounced uncertainty relating not only to the expected returns on such 
investments, which make the acquisition of capital for such endeavors problematic, but also to 
large uncertainties associated with the future challenges of climate change and the extent and 
development of policy intervention (ibid.). The latter is particularly true for eco-innovation. 
These particularities of environmental technological change support the notion that a strong 
regulatory framework is necessary in order to attain the socially desirable levels of innovation 
and technology adoption. Rennings (2000) therefore coined the term “regulatory push/pull 
effect”, which summarizes policy efforts aimed at the provision of increased incentives to 
research and adopt new technology aimed at the reduction of environmentally harmful 
impacts of productive activity.  
 
3.2. Evolutionary Perspectives 
The arguments examined so far all portray technological change as an investment activity 
guided by profit considerations of private actors. However, while the neoclassical approach 
exhibits considerable advantages when analyzing incremental or marginal technological 
change (Rennings, 2000) induced by, for instance, price incentives, its reliance on equilibrium 
models and the related, heroic assumptions about the behavior of economic subjects provoked 
the emergence of new approaches to the concept of technological change, with Nelson and 
Winter (1982) constituting the most prominent and influential proponents thereof. 
During the 1970s Nelson and Winter released a series of articles (Nelson & Winter, 1973, 
1974, 1975) leading up to their influential 1982 book An Evolutionary Theory of Technical 
Change. The theory draws on biological research in that it employs evolutionary concepts 
such as variation, selection and stabilization for the explanation of the process of 
technological change. Building on the behavioral theory of the firm, it aims for a more 
realistic description of the underlying mechanisms of R&D (Ruttan, 1997), which are said to 
remain in a “black box” in neoclassical approaches (Rennings, 2000; Ruttan, 1997). This is a 
circumstance which, according to Rennings (2000), also limits the capacity of neoclassical 
approaches to appreciate radical change, especially in organizational and societal terms. The 
central argument of the theory is that due to the large uncertainties associated with the 
outcomes of technological change, firms are incapable of making optimal investment 
decisions. In this regard Nelson and Winter (1982) rely on Simon´s (1947) notion of bounded 
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rationality, causing economic actors to engage in “satisficing” as opposed to optimizing 
behavior. According to this notion, arriving at an optimal decision requires investment that, 
by far, outweighs the additional benefit as compared to a sub-optimal decision. Nelson and 
Winter (1982) therefore argue that firms determine innovation-related investment decisions 
by the way of “rules of thumb” and “routines”. 
Based on these premises, Porter and van der Linde (1995) developed what has become known 
as the Porter hypothesis. As firms are no longer assumed to behave in an optimizing fashion, 
it is no longer possible to be sure that new constraints, as imposed by policy intervention, lead 
to higher costs. At least theoretically, the possibility exists that a satisficing firm, forced to 
reevaluate its strategy in response to such a constraint, discovers inefficiencies in its 
operations and ultimately finds ways of increasing its profit. Porter and van der Linde (1995, 
p. 98), as well as other so-called “win-win” theorists, argue that regulation can lead to 
“innovation offsets”, which “can not only lower the net cost of meeting environmental 
regulations, but can even lead to absolute advantages over firms in foreign countries, not 
subject to similar regulations”. Several reasons have been presented for such offsets to occur. 
Firstly, policy intervention can potentially direct the attention of firms towards resource 
inefficiencies. If pollution is assumed to be an indicator for the wasteful use of resources, 
regulation can provide signals which guide efforts towards cost-saving efficiency 
improvements (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). Secondly, regulation is able to decrease the 
uncertainties surrounding eco-innovation investments by making the social benefits of 
reduced environmental impacts valuable at a private level – a situation that, due to the 
externality problems elaborated on earlier, is unlikely to arise in the absence of regulation. 
Another argument linked to the externalities discussed is that regulation drives the acquisition 
or dissemination of valuable information, which based on its properties of a public good, 
tends to be underprovided. Ultimately, Porter and van der Linde (1995, p. 100) point out the 
pressures created by regulation as an important factor “to overcome inertia, foster creative 
thinking and mitigate agency problems”. In their influential article, Porter and van der Linde 
(1995) present numerous case studies indicating that firms have been able to profit via the 
exploitation of previously undiscovered potentials for efficiency improvements in response to 
the imposition of new regulation.  
The win-win hypothesis has been met with skepticism25 by economists (e.g. Palmer, Oates & 
Portney, 1995), and its empirical plausibility seems to be limited (Cames, 2010). 
                                                            
25 For a detailed overview of concrete criticism see Jaffe et al. (2003, p. 487-488). 
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Nevertheless, evolutionary approaches have found their way into the research debate 
surrounding environmental technological change as of late (e.g. Arentsen, Kemp & Luiten, 
2002; Cames, 2010; Fri, 2003; Jaffe et al., 2003; Kemp, 1997; Rennings, 2000; Rogge et al., 
2011; Rogge et al., 2011), and are recognized as important in providing complementary 
insights to the process of technological change, as they allow for a broader appreciation of 
diverse factors outside the reach of neoclassical approaches. Rennings (2000) considers it 
beneficial to link neoclassical and evolutionary approaches, and refers to Kemp´s (1997) 
approach of introducing uncertainty, technology characteristics and consumer preference via 
evolutionary models while retaining elements of rational choice and optimization found in 
neoclassical models. In a similar vein, Del Rio Gonzalez (2009), in reference to works by Rip 
and Kemp (1998) and Unruh (2000), argues that evolutionary economics can provide the 
framework for integrating a multitude of perspectives on technological change in order to 
appreciate the inherent complexities of the process. 
 
3.3. Emissions Trading, Efficiency, and Technological Change 
As touched upon in section 2.1, there are two broad categories of environmental policies. In 
comparison to so-called command and control policies, market-based instruments are 
generally preferable from an economic point of view (Requate & Unold, 2003). This 
preference is based on their superiority with respect to several economic criteria, most clearly 
outlined by Fritsch, Wein, and Ewers (2003) and Endres (2007).  
One assessment criterion concerns the efficacy of an instrument in attaining a predetermined 
environmental objective, referred to as environmental accuracy. As briefly outlined in section 
2.2, emissions trading involves the setting of a total permit amount, which, as long as the 
enforcement regime is intact, ensures that a certain amount of emissions is not exceeded. The 
biggest advantage of emissions trading in this regard is that it does not require continued 
intervention, regardless of the growth rates of the economy or inflation, two factors which 
emissions standards and emissions taxes are susceptible to (Bader, 2000).  
Secondly, the economic theory of environmental policy has long focused on the static 
efficiency of policy instruments. That is the capacity of a given instrument to achieve its 
environmental objective at the lowest cost. The cost-efficiency of permit trading has 
frequently been pointed out as a crucial advantage over command and control approaches 
(e.g. Tietenberg, 1985; Tietenberg, 2006). Figure 1 visualizes the advantages of permit trading 
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vis-à-vis command and control instruments in a two-firm setting with differing abatement 
costs, under the assumption that total emissions are to be decreased by 50 percent, irrespective 
of the applied policy instrument, to 0
2
E . A BMAC   represents the aggregate social abatement 
cost, which consists of the marginal, individual abatement cost curves of the respective firms. 
In the case of a command and control instrument, firm A is expected to decrease its emissions 
to 0
2
AE  at the marginal abatement cost of AC . While facing equal constraints, firm B, 
however, operates at a higher marginal abatement cost of BC . This circumstance indicates 
that the situation under a command and control policy is inefficient (Weimann, 1991). This 
notion finds support in several empirical analyses (e.g. Atkinson & Lewis, 1974; Atkinson & 
Tietenberg, 1982; McGartland & Oates, 1985; Tietenberg, 1974). Under permit trading a 
different situation arises. As the environmental objective remains unchanged, the regulator 
issues A amount of allowances equal to the target of 0
2
E . However, in this case, firm B, facing 
a higher marginal abatement cost, will choose to reduce its emissions no further than to BE at 
a cost of P, while acquiring additional emissions permits to cover its remaining emissions. 
Simultaneously, firm A, facing a lower marginal abatement cost, will decrease its emissions 
by a factor larger than under command and control, reaching AE , also at cost P. Exceeding 
emissions will again be covered via the acquisition of additional allowances. This example 
shows that the flexibility of emissions trading enables the equalization of marginal abatement 
costs, resulting in a cost-efficient approach (Weiman, 1991). Companies facing low marginal 
abatement costs will prefer avoiding emissions, freeing up allowances, which consequently 
can be acquired by firms facing higher marginal abatement costs. The efficiency improvement 
under emissions trading is visualized by the area XYZ. In conclusion, static efficiency of 
emissions trading is superior to command and control instruments. It should be noted that 
environmental economists are not in agreement whether emissions trading or emissions taxes 
are superior in this regard; however, this debate has no influence on this work and will 
therefore be omitted. 
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Figure 1 – Efficiency of Emissions Trading vs. Command and Control 
 
Source: Cames (2010). 
 
While static efficiency properties are important for the efficient use of resources under given 
technological circumstances, the dynamic efficiency of policy instruments, that is their 
capacity to stimulate the search for and application of novel abatement approaches, has 
enjoyed increasingly more attention as of late (Endres, Bertram & Rundshagen, 2007). There 
has been a considerable amount of theoretical analyses comparing different policy 
instruments´ abilities in this regard, and the results are mixed26. However, this study neither 
attempts to justify the choice of emissions trading as an environmental instrument, nor tries to 
establish a ranking amongst different instruments. Therefore, the following paragraphs will 
merely present the theoretical arguments building the very foundation of the premise that 
emissions trading spurs technological change, and illuminate how such change is being 
incentivized, what the potential shortcomings of emissions trading are in that context, and 
which design features factor into its innovation-inducing capacity. 
                                                            
26 Supra, note 8.  
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Figure 2 – Innovation Incentives of Emissions Trading vs. Command and Control 
 
Source: Cames (2010). 
 
Based on the seminal works of Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989), 
Figure 2 illustrates the difference in cost savings associated with technological change under 
command and control vis-à-vis emissions trading, for a single firm. Prior to policy 
intervention, emissions levels are at 0E . Under a command and control policy, this company 
is required to cut its emissions to 1E . With its current technology, marginal abatement costs 
are at p, while total abatement costs equal area 0 1E E B . With the introduction of a new 
technology, the marginal abatement cost curve MAC shifts left, reducing the company´s total 
abatement costs by the area 0E CB . This area describes the individual price incentive to 
decrease emissions. Contrastingly, in the case of emissions trading, allowances amounting to 
1E  are issued, leading to a permit price of p. Total abatement costs with the initial technology 
amount to the area 0 0E pB . The shift of the marginal abatement cost curve, caused by the 
introduction of new technology, leads to savings the size of the area 0E AB . The achieved cost 
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savings via technological change under a policy of permit trading thereby exceed those under 
the alternative instrument by the area of CAB, showing that incentives for technological 
change are more pronounced under emissions trading. 
It is important to note that, ceteris paribus, the company´s demand for emissions allowances 
drops to TE  after innovating. Based on the assumption that the single firm examined in Figure 
2 is small enough, compared to the entire population of regulated entities, this development 
has a negligible effect on the price of allowances. However, the widespread introduction of 
innovative technology across larger parts of the regulated population will cause allowance 
prices to decrease (Milliman & Prince, 1989), as a result of a significant reduction in the 
demand of allowances. As the allowance price is of crucial relevance for the trading schemes 
innovation-inducing capacity (Schleich & Betz, 2005), with higher prices creating larger 
incentives, this effect needs to be offset via the gradual reduction of the cap at rates 
corresponding to the rate of progress (Cames, 2010). As mentioned in section 2.2, the EU 
ETS now incorporates a centralized and gradual cap reduction paired with ambitious 
environmental objectives, indicating that policy makers are aware of this effect. Nevertheless, 
Keohane (1999) is skeptical of regulators´ capabilities to identify the appropriate rate of such 
reduction, a view supported by notions of public choice theory (Rennings, 2000). In relation 
to this criticism, Fischer et al. (2003) posit that emissions taxes would be superior. 
While the conclusion that emissions trading provides larger incentives than command and 
control policies may seem odd at first glance, the underlying argument is widely recognized 
(e.g. Downing & White, 1986; Jung et al., 1996; Kerr & Newell, 2003; Milliman & Prince, 
1986; Sorrell & Skea, 1999). At its core, this advantage of market-based instruments, and 
emissions trading in particular, lies in the premise that command and control instruments 
provide no incentives for abatement efforts going beyond the prescribed objective. Emissions 
trading on the other hand provides continuous remuneration for such efforts. In economic 
terms, such remuneration comes in the form of additional revenue, either via the sale of 
excess allowances that have been freed up through the implementation of new technology, or 
via the cost savings associated with a decreased total amount of acquired allowances 
(Rennings, 2000; Schleich & Betz, 2005). This circumstance leads to what Tietenberg (1985, 
p. 33) calls direct innovation effects, i.e., the accelerated diffusion of efficient technology 
and/or increased R&D of such (Kerr & Newell, 2003). These theoretical arguments for the 
superiority of emissions trading have also been called into question, most notably by Malueg 
(1989), who argues that the strength of innovation incentives under emissions trading highly 
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depends on whether a firm is a buyer or a seller of emissions allowances. The central claim of 
Malueg (1989) is that the acquisition of additional allowances can constitute a relatively 
inexpensive compliance strategy. Therefore, according to Malueg (1989), companies that are 
buyers of allowances before the potential acquisition of new abatement technology, and 
would remain buyers after its acquisition, face lower incentives to adopt new technology than 
under command and control approaches, where such a firm would be forced to invest in 
abatement to some predefined degree. Companies that already are, and consequently remain, 
sellers of permits after the acquisition of new technology do however face larger incentives 
under emissions trading. In cases in which the market role changes from buyer to seller, 
Malueg´s (1989) findings are ambiguous.  
The arguments and advantages outlined hitherto mostly originate from neoclassical 
economics. However, one potential advantage of emissions trading becomes especially 
apparent when viewing the instrument via the rather systems-oriented evolutionary 
perspective. As touched upon in the previous section, this approach emphasizes the 
importance of concepts such as selection and variety in the process of technological change 
(e.g. Metcalfe, 1994; Nelson, 1995). Emissions trading, compared to command and control 
approaches, provides regulated entities with substantially more freedom of choice concerning 
their compliance options (Swift, 2001). Prescribed abatement solutions are said to suspend the 
development of new technology, as such would not match legislation (Jaffe et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, the possibilities of partial abatement (Bader, 2000), and even so-called business-
as-usual scenarios, are not excluded (Rennings, 2000). This has the advantage that firms can 
defer large investments in order to obtain more effective or advanced solutions down the road 
(ibid.). These considerations find support in Newell and Stavins (2003), who emphasize that 
“abatement cost heterogeneity is a fundamental determinant of the potential cost-savings 
associated with market-based instruments”.  
Another consideration that has implications for the innovation effects of emissions trading is 
the associated policy uncertainty (Engau & Hoffmann, 2009; Hoffmann, Trautmann & 
Schneider, 2008; Marcus, 1981), which has enjoyed more attention in some of the recent 
literature identifying particular design features as more relevant to technological change than 
the instrument type itself (Kemp & Pontoglio, 2008; Vollebergh, 2007). Rogge et al. (2011a, 
p. 515) stress the importance of the predictability of policy instruments, especially if long-
lived capital-intensive investments are concerned, as can be considered the case in sectors 
covered by the EU ETS. From a neoclassical perspective, it is rather apparent that a trading 
scheme cannot provide the same type of planning security as could command and control 
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approaches. The EU ETS´s permit price, identified as a crucial component of the instrument´s 
innovation incentives earlier, is subject to demand and supply, making it inherently 
responsive to market developments (Rennings, 2000). From an evolutionary point of view, 
which allows for the appreciation of uncertainties originating from the complex interactions 
between institutional, social, political and managerial dimensions of technological change 
(Schleich & Betz, 2005), the issue is ever so present. As, for instance, Fri (2003) and 
Arentsen, Kemp, and Luiten (2002) acknowledge, the multiplicity of actors and their 
respective decisions are an important factor of influence in sectors in which technological 
change is a tedious process. The EU ETS has been characterized by significant changes, and 
although the primary reason for authors such as Hoffmann et al. (2008) and Hoffmann et al. 
(2009) to ascribe substantial regulatory uncertainty to the scheme, namely the NAP approach, 
has been remedied, trading phases remain relatively short, and the regulatory details of, for 
instance, future allocation rules often remain nebulous due to the largely unpredictable nature 
of political negotiation.  
Directly related to the concept of regulatory uncertainty is the problem of credible policy 
commitment (Brunner, Flachsland & Marschinski, 2012). Credibility has been recognized as 
an issue in a multitude of regulatory contexts (Helm, Hepburn & Mash, 2003), and its 
introduction to the academic debate is mostly traced back to macroeconomic policy analysis 
by the likes of Kydland and Prescott (1977), and Barro and Gordon (1983). The general 
argument underlying credible policy commitment issues is the fact that regulatory 
environments are subject to political influences, which, due to regular elections can change 
frequently, thereby increasing regulatory uncertainty, undermining political commitment, and 
consequently harming the investment environment. In regard to carbon-related policy, 
Brunner et al. (2012, p. 255) describe the relation between policy commitment and 
investments in neoclassical terms as follows:  
“Rational actors will discount the expected carbon price and will do so even more when it is 
felt that the government might not stick to its commitment. Firms will either postpone 
investing until uncertainty regarding future carbon policy is resolved or require higher rates 
of return. In both cases, this will reduce the total level of emissions abatement.”  
While the neoclassical argument is of paramount importance to the analysis of the impact of 
regulatory uncertainty on investment decisions, the evolutionary appreciation of the 
multiplicity of involved actors and institutions is equally important. Although it can be argued 
that EU legislation is not subject to the same political cycles as domestic policy, and that the 
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fundamental design of the instrument (including a harmonized and centrally administered cap 
and allocation approach) remains intact, the shaping of the rules of the EU ETS is influenced 
by many stakeholders, including national politicians, and organized interests.  
 
3.4. Research Framework 
In defining environmental innovations scholars commonly rely on guidelines provided by the 
OECD and Eurostat (2005) in the so-called Oslo Manual (e.g. Rogge et al., 2011a; Rogge et 
al., 2011b; Rennings, 2000; Rennings & Rammer, 2011). According to the manual, 
environmental innovations encompass product or process innovations, as well as 
organizational innovations, which contribute to a reduced environmental impact. A process 
innovation enables the production of a certain output with reduced input factors. Product 
innovations describe the improvement of current products (goods or services) or the 
introduction of new ones. Organizational innovations occur when new organizational methods 
are introduced or new business practices are implemented. The application of the Oslo 
Manual also allows for a focus on innovation and technological change that is new to the firm, 
as opposed to new to the world. Explicitly accounting for the different forms of innovation 
furthermore appears necessary in assessing the impact of environmental regulation (Bernauer, 
Engels, Kammerer & Seijas, 2006), given that differential impacts based on such a distinction 
have previously been discovered (e.g. Cleff & Rennings, 1999; Hemmelskamp, 1999). 
In line with the guidelines, Kemp and Pearson (2007, p. 7) provide the following definition of 
eco-innovation: “Eco-innovation is the production, application or exploitation of a good, 
service, production process, organizational structure, or management or business method 
that is novel to the firm or user and which results, throughout its life cycle, in a reduction of 
environmental risk, pollution and the negative impacts of resource use (including energy use) 
compared to relevant alternatives”.  
However, in keeping with the neoclassical and evolutionary conceptualizations of 
technological change, the process is differentiated into research, development and 
demonstration (RD&D), adoption, and organizational change. The first dimension describes 
the execution of basic laboratory research, testing of new technology on a small scale and the 
first larger scale implementation thereof (Rogge et. al, 2011). Adoption refers to the 
acquisition of advanced technology, which can entail both the ex-post modification of 
operational facilities or the construction of entirely new ones. Organizational change 
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describes the modification of existing or introduction of new business procedures, operational 
approaches, organizational structures, and altered perspectives or conceptions contributing to 
a changed vision. While investigating these dimensions, the above distinction derived from 
the Oslo Manual and the provided definition of eco-innovation remain important for several 
reasons. Both the development and adoption of new technology remain subject to the 
differentiation of product and process innovation, while simultaneously the focus on 
innovations new to the firm remains. Lastly, the prerequisite of such innovations enhancing 
the environmental performance of an operation precludes the acknowledgement of 
innovations unrelated to environmental performance.  
The creation of the research framework moreover draws considerably on the 
recommendations and suggestions furthered by Bernauer, Engels, Kammerer and Seijas 
(2006), and del Rio Gonzalez (2009). The authors provide guidelines for the empirical 
assessment of regulation-induced eco-innovation, incorporating the neoclassical and 
evolutionary theories and approaches discussed in the preceding section, ultimately allowing 
for the construction of a multidimensional framework. Such a framework acknowledges not 
only the influences of regulation, but also context factors, such as firm-external factors like 
market conditions, including consumer demands, and competitiveness, as well as firm-internal 
circumstances, such as commitment to environmental sustainability and firm size. Figure 3 
depicts the applied framework. 
Following the recommendations by Bernauer et al. (2006) and del Rio Gonzalez (2009), and 
based on the discoveries of Ashford, Ayers & Stone (1985), the influence of the policy 
instrument is being assessed via its stringency on the one hand, and, based on findings of 
Ashford et al. (1985), Engau and Hoffmann (2009) and Jaenicke (1997), via its predictability 
on the other. Both criteria have been found to be positively related to the rate and direction of 
technological change (e.g. Ashford et al., 11985; Engau & Hoffmann, 2009).  
Stringency is commonly used to describe the amount of change the compliance with a given 
policy instrument induces in a firm (Bernauer et al., 2006). Data concerning stringency is rare 
(Del Rio Gonzalez, 2009), which has lead this variable to be expressed via compliance costs 
in earlier research (e.g. Rogge et el., 2011a; Kerr & Newell, 2003). The stringency of the EU 
ETS is determined by several factors (Schleich & Betz, 2005). Firstly, the allowance price and 
thereby the emissions cap are a crucial component of price and cost incentives, as explained 
in the previous sub-section. The lower the quantity of allowances in circulation, the more 
pronounced their scarcity and consequently the higher their price. Additionally, stringency 
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depends on the rules governing the allocation of allowances (Schleich & Betz, 2005). To 
appreciate the peculiarities of the allocation process and the associated rules, a brief excurse 
building on the introduction in section 2.2 will be necessary. 
Figure 3 – Research Framework 
 
Source: Author´s drawing; adaptation of Bernauer et al. (2003). 
 
The abolishment of the NAP approach to allocation with the beginning of the third phase of 
the EU ETS went hand in hand with new rules and procedures regarding the allocation of the 
allowances. Although the free allocation of allowances was abolished in favor of auctioning 
as the default mode of allocation (Ellerman et al., 2014), auctioning remains in the process of 
phase-in until 2027 (ibid.). While the electric utility sector already faces full auctioning, with 
minor exceptions, other sectors, depending on their exposure to competitive pressures from 
outside the Union, and their associated risk of carbon leakage27, still enjoy the free allocation 
of allowances28,29.Clearly, the imposed compliance cost depends on whether allowances are 
allocated free of charge or need to be acquired at market price. Large differences with respect 
                                                            
27 “Carbon leakage refers to the situation that may occur if, for reasons of costs related to climate policies, 
businesses were to transfer production to other countries with laxer emission constraints. This could lead to an 
increase in their total emissions.” - EU (2017, June 19). “Carbon Leakage”. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/leakage_en (19.06.2017). 
28 For the current carbon leakage list see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0746&from=EN (19.06.2017). 
29 The precise rules governing free allocation are not relevant to this study and will therefore be omitted. For a 
recent detailed account see Stenqvist & Åhman (2016). 
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to this circumstance were to be observed in the chosen sample of firms, with freely allocated 
allowances ranging from approximately 12 percent to approximately 131 percent of verified 
annual emissions in 201530. While it could be argued that this indicates continued 
overallocation to some extent, it is to be kept in mind that the market situation for some 
manufacturing industries at risk of carbon leakage has not yet recovered entirely and low 
demand consequently contributes to lower-than-expected emissions levels. In addition, the 
geographical location of the Republic of Croatia, with direct borders to extra-EU countries, 
increases the risk of carbon leakage and competitive pressure from extra-EU manufacturers 
considerably.  
The second policy feature included in the framework, predictability, is directly related to 
questions of uncertainty discussed in the preceding sub-section. Predictability describes the 
level of certainty associated with the given policy instrument in light of potential future 
changes (Hoffmann et al., 2008). Engau & Hoffmann (2009) show that firms which perceive 
high regulatory uncertainty are more likely to postpone strategic decisions such as 
investments in abatement technology. Higher levels of certainty reduce the risk associated 
with such investments, and therefore have a positive impact on innovation (Bernauer et al., 
2006). So far, research suggests that the EU ETS is characterized by high levels of uncertainty 
(e.g. Engau & Hoffmann, 2009; Hoffmann et al., 2008, Cames, 2004). However, these studies 
are focused on the first two trading phases, which in terms of certainty differ considerably 
from the current phase. Not only has the length of trading phases increased from initially 3 to 
5 and then to 8 years, but the NAP approach, which was identified as a source of significant 
regulatory uncertainty (Hoffmann et al. 2008), was replaced by a centrally determined 
allowance budget and allocation rules. The evaluation criterion of predictability also needs to 
take into account the previously acknowledged issues surrounding credible policy 
commitment (Brunner et al., 2012; Helm et al., 2003). Even if the perceived predictability of 
the instrument´s future development is found to remain low, perceptions of credible 
commitment to climate change policies could still foster an environment in which regulated 
entities invest in abatement technology in anticipation of continuously tightened controls. 
Furthermore, this study incorporates firm-external context factors (del Rio Gonzalez, 2009) in 
its research framework, capturing relevant influences from social, institutional and market 
actors. Besides the EU ETS, it is advisable to pay attention to the influence of the policy mix, 
since domestic legislation, such as for example support for renewable sources of energy 
                                                            
30 Author´s calculations based on data from the European Union Transaction Log, retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/oha.do (19.06.2017). 
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(Croatian Environment Agency, 2015), or other international legislation, such as for example 
the Industrial Emissions Directive31, could prove more influential than, or at least 
complementary to, the EU ETS. Firm-external influences furthermore cover market 
influences, such as market structure, and demand factors. Findings and predictions concerning 
the influence of market structure are ambiguous (Bernauer et al., 2006). While the industrial 
organization literature predicts decreased innovation activity in highly competitive markets, 
this notion finds no support in empirical evidence (Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith & 
Howitt, 2005). Based on work by Scherer (1967), a strand of literature emerged which asserts 
an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. Indeed, there is empirical 
support for the existence of non-linearities in the innovation process (Aghion et al., 2005). It 
also appears that high levels of competition are conducive especially of product innovation 
activity, since competitive pressures require firms to differentiate themselves via superior 
product quality, whereas firms operating in concentrated markets are more prone to 
investments in process innovation (Link, 1982). Related to improved product quality, the 
strategic management and green marketing literature asserts that market demand for green 
products exerts considerable influence on innovation activity in that direction, since firms 
come to realize that improved environmental performance constitutes an important 
differentiation tool (e.g. Belz, 2001; Meffert & Kirchgeorg, 1998).  
Moreover, innovation activity can be influenced by firm-internal determinants. 
Acknowledging these enables the study to appreciate firm heterogeneity, which has been 
found to impact corporate strategy (Barney, 1991). They are especially emphasized (Bernauer 
et al., 2006) in the evolutionary, resource-based approach to innovation (e.g. Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). Small firms usually do not command similarly ample resources as large firms, 
either in terms of finance, technical know-how or human capital (Bernauer et al., 2006; del 
Rio Gonzalez, 2009), ultimately constituting a restraint to innovation activity. Firm size has 
also been found to influence the type of innovation most likely to occur in a given firm 
(Scherer, 1983; Cohen & Klepper, 1996). Lastly, the framework takes account of the 
proactivity of environmental strategies of firms, which, resulting from the commitment of 
higher management levels to environmental performance (Kagan et al., 2003), exerts positive 
influence on environmental innovation activities (Bernauer et al., 2006; del Rio Gonzalez, 
2009).  
                                                            
31 EU (2010, December 17). “Directive 2010/75/EU”. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010L0075&from=EN (20.06.2017). 
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Having established a research framework building on relevant theory and recommendations 
from the more recent literature, the following paragraph briefly returns to the main and 
ancillary research questions this work seeks to answer, after which the applied methodology is 
discussed. 
First and foremost, it is this research´s aim to answer whether the EU ETS has contributed to 
an increased focus on the development and adoption of products, processes, and business 
practices aimed at the reduction of GHG emissions. Therefore, the central research question 
of this study is: Has the introduction of the EU ETS induced innovation activity among 
emissions-intensive business operators in the Republic of Croatia? In answering this question, 
it needs to be established whether such innovation activity in fact takes place, to what extent it 
takes place, and how it is distributed across the various innovation dimensions. Then it needs 
to be determined to what extent these activities have been influenced by the EU ETS, whether 
a regulatory push/pull effect is detectable, and how the instrument with its various design 
features and mechanisms has impacted regulated companies´ decisions concerning such 
efforts. In doing so, it also needs to be examined what role context factors play relative to the 
policy instrument.  
 
4. Methodology 
In order to empirically assess whether the EU ETS does in fact promote firm-level innovation, 
a multiple case study approach was selected. The approach was chosen based on its suitability 
for the examination of complex contemporary phenomena (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). 
Furthermore, the choice enables the comprehensive collection of relevant aspects of real-life 
events, including managerial and organizational processes (Yin, 2009), such as investment 
decisions in new technology. Case study designs are commonly employed in social sciences 
research, including case studies of public administration (e.g. Agranoff & Radin, 1991), 
which can be considered to encompass decisions on the design of environmental policies, 
such as the EU ETS.  
Although there is no universally accepted rule for when to employ a case study design, Yin 
(2009) provides some conditions which should be met to avoid a grave misfit, including a 
focus on contemporary events, incapacity of the researcher to manipulate the relevant 
behavior pertaining to such events, and research questions dealing with “operational links 
needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 2009, p. 9). 
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Considering that the EU ETS is currently operational, undergoes periodical revision and, as a 
market-based instrument, is subject to market forces, it is safe to say that its effects on 
regulated entities constitute a complex contemporary phenomenon. This holds equally true for 
considerations about technological change and innovation. Moreover, as corporate decisions 
concerning innovation, be it via specific investments or organizational changes, are guided by 
factors far beyond the control of the researcher, the behavior of the units of observation can be 
considered immune to manipulations by the researcher. This circumstance then satisfies the 
second condition for relying on case study designs. Lastly, as this work is examining how the 
relatively abrupt introduction of the hitherto most stringent emissions trading policy is 
exerting influence on certain decisions, while taking into consideration its former absence, 
current form and potential future developments, operational links with a view to changes over 
time are center stage. Thereby all prerequisites for the use of a case study are met. 
It is also worth pointing out that the method has been employed in a number of previous 
works relating to the innovation-inducing effects of environmental policy, and specifically the 
EU ETS (Hoffmann, 2007; Rogge, Schleich, Haussmann, Roser & Reitze, 2011; Rogge, 
Schneider & Hoffmann, 2010), as discussed in the literature review section of this work.  
The following paragraphs will illuminate several methodologically relevant aspects, including 
the choice of cases, and the employed data collection and data analysis methods. Moreover, 
some of the methodological difficulties will be discussed in relation to the individual steps 
during which they emerged. Finally, the section will address the credibility and validity of the 
conducted work.  
 
4.1.  Case Selection 
In line with the characteristics of qualitative research (Miles & Huberman, 1994), the central 
aim in selecting relevant cases was to allow for the analytical generalization of findings (Yin, 
2009), rather than creating a statistically representative sample allowing for statistical 
generalization, a strategy prevalent in quantitative research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Analogous to multiple experiments (Yin, 2009), multiple case study designs rely on a 
replication logic in order to enable such analytical generalization (ibid.), as opposed to a 
sampling logic usually employed in surveys. By replicating the findings from one experiment, 
the results of the initial experiment are being solidified (ibid.). Applied to case study research, 
this means that cases need to be selected on the basis of either achieving literal replication, 
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that is discovering similar results due to similar conditions, or theoretical replication, that is 
predictably dissimilar results due to deviations in certain conditions (ibid.).  
This goes to show that the selection of cases is not based on representative grounds but on 
conceptual ones (Miles & Huberman, 1994), which in turn are grounded in the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. Yin (2009) stresses the importance of a rich theoretical framework, 
as developed in the preceding section, for the exercise of replication procedures, as it provides 
the conditions under which one can expect certain results to emerge, or not to emerge.  
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), there are two central actions to be taken in 
selecting cases. First certain boundaries need to be established. On the one hand, such 
boundaries are influenced by the present limitations in resources, such as time. On the other, 
however, cases need to be selected, which “directly connect to your research questions, and 
that probably will include examples of what you want to study” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 
27). Secondly, it is necessary to establish “a frame to help you uncover, confirm, or qualify 
the basic processes or constructs that undergird your study” (ibid., p. 27). This second action 
relates to the importance of a well-developed theoretical framework, stressed by Yin (2009), 
which enables the identification of certain conditions and circumstances whose variation 
potentially contribute to the robustness of findings (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). 
Considering that innovation in the private realm usually takes place at the firm level, it is 
apparent that the unit of analysis are firms. Keeping in mind the necessity of a direct 
connection to the research questions and this work´s concern with the EU ETS, it is also 
apparent that the chosen companies need to operate at least one installation covered by the EU 
ETS. This boundary already minimized the potentially relevant cases for this research to 40 
companies, operating all 59 installations covered by the EU ETS in the Republic of Croatia, 
as identified via the respective company accounts within the European Union Transaction 
Log. Another 7 of those relevant companies have failed to report emissions during the 
relevant period, have reported zero emissions, or have since the introduction of the EU ETS 
been excluded from the scheme, leaving 33 companies. Another 15 of the remaining 33 
companies exhibit emissions levels below 25,000 tons of CO2 annually, thereby being 
categorized as mini in size by the European Environment Agency (EEA). Those companies 
were excluded for several reasons. Firstly, combined, these companies represented a mere 
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1.07 percent32 of total annual emissions covered by the EU ETS in the Republic of Croatia, as 
of 2016. Secondly, in the year 2016, these companies, on average, received approximately 
135 percent of their annual emissions allowances via free allocation. Furthermore, 111.7 
percent of the total emissions of mini operators were covered by free allowances in 2016. It is 
reasonable to assume that these circumstances weaken any motivation to undertake eco-
innovations aimed at emissions reductions, and mostly disable the exploitation of economies 
of scale for these operators, as the additional cost imposed by the EU ETS is negligible 
compared to the investment cost of both state-of-the-art emissions abatement technology and 
research and development. It is therefore also reasonable to assume that those cases are 
unlikely to include examples of the phenomena under investigation in this study or to aid in 
uncovering or confirming any of its underlying processes or constructs, thereby not matching 
the selection criteria as posited by Miles and Huberman (1994).  
The remaining 18 companies were then categorized along the employed theoretical frame, 
with firm-internal and firm-external characteristics determining their respective suitability for 
examination. In order to appreciate the inherent diversity and heterogeneity of the emissions-
intensive corporate landscape and the associated diversity in reactions to regulatory 
impetuses, such as the EU ETS, differences in firm characteristics represent an important 
feature of the chosen sample. As such, companies from diverse sectors, of different size, 
different emissions intensity, and different corporate vision were chosen.  
A total of 14 companies were identified as suitable cases and consecutively contacted via e-
mail. E-mail addresses were acquired via the respective company websites, and in some cases 
provided by fellow researchers who had been in prior contact with the respective companies 
in the course of other projects. Initial contact e-mails included a brief explanation for getting 
in touch and several attachments, including an introduction letter explaining the research´s 
motivation, relevance, method, and use, as well as a non-disclosure declaration and a 
document confirming the author´s affiliation with a well-renowned Croatian research institute, 
so as to bolster credibility and trustworthiness. For several reasons, which will be outlined in 
sub-section 4.4, the final number of cases amounts to five. The five companies examined 
during this study, however, match the desired variation criteria, and thereby allow for the 
desired replication processes. The final sample includes large and medium emitters, as 
defined by the EEA, companies of different size, with differing vision, operating in different 
                                                            
32 The percentages presented throughout this paragraph are based on the author´s own calculations, which in turn 
are based on data from the European Union Transaction Log, retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/oha.do (04.05.2017). 
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sectors. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the examined companies represent 67 percent of 
total annual emissions of the Republic of Croatia.  
 
4.2.  Data Collection 
The case studies were conducted through April and May of 2017, which marks the fifth year 
of EU ETS participation of regulated companies in the Republic of Croatia. A total of five 
company case studies were conducted, each entailing the careful examination of background 
information retrieved from archival data, such as company websites and annual reports, and 
consequent semi-structured interviews with company officials. This approach of interviewing, 
as opposed to fully structured interviews, allowed for a deeper understanding of complex 
issues (Brenner, 2006), the appreciation of contextual conditions (Yin, 2010), and the 
avoidance of suggestive questions (ibid.). Based on the background analyses, the respective 
interview guides were customized to a certain extent in order to avoid questions irrelevant to 
certain sectors. To the largest extent, however, the degree of uniformity among the interview 
guides was kept high so as to ensure comparability.  
Interviews were conducted face-to-face in the majority of cases, with the exception of two 
telephone interviews. Depending on the organizational configuration of the participating 
companies, the number of interviewees varied between one and four, totaling at ten 
interviewees. As far as possible, given constraints in time and availability, the interviewed 
officials covered the functions relevant to eco-innovation, including strategy, environmental 
sustainability, technology, and sales. Interviews lasted between 50 and 180 minutes, totaling 
at approximately 390 minutes.  
Interview questions were related to the relevant factors and determinants identified and 
operationalized in the preceding section, including eco-innovation strategies, sustainability 
strategies, corporate social responsibility, R&D activity, technology adoption, corporate 
vision, the perceived role of the EU ETS in relation to these concepts and several context 
factors.  
During interviews the interviewer took detailed notes, which were subsequently used to 
compile detailed research protocols, which in turn were used for data analysis, the 
particularities of which will be discussed in the succeeding sub-section.  
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4.3.  Data Analysis 
In designing a case study, it is advisable to select some analytic strategy in order to facilitate 
data analysis by ensuring the collection of relevant and analyzable data (Yin, 2009). This 
study combines two analytical strategies by first and foremost relying on theoretical 
propositions (Yin, 2009) developed in the preceding section. These propositions guide the 
data collection plan by determining the research questions and the reviewed literature (ibid.). 
Moreover, the underlying theoretical propositions also unveil potential rival explanations 
(ibid.), the examination of which serves as the second analytical strategy included in this 
work.  
Once an analytical strategy has been chosen, a desirable analytical technique needs to be 
picked. As mentioned elsewhere, qualitative case studies rely on analytical generalization, 
which in turn involves the reconciliation of previously developed theory with empirical 
results (Yin, 2009). The most desirable technique (ibid.) to perform such a task is the 
employment of pattern matching. When it comes to analyzing data from multiple cases, cross-
case analysis furthermore plays a significant role (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Once an initial 
case has been examined in detail and a pattern has been discovered, which corresponds with 
the theoretical propositions, successive cases are examined in order to determine whether the 
observed pattern holds true for a larger population. Moreover, cases are analyzed which due 
to theoretical propositions can be assumed to yield different results.  
In performing these analytical tasks, a four-step approach mirroring the delineated 
methodology was followed. Initially, a code list, founded on the theoretical framework, was 
developed, which was then refined in the process of coding the first interview. Secondly, 
interview protocols were triangulated with archival data in order to investigate any 
discrepancies and to increase construct validity. Then, the remaining interviews were coded, 
and based on these codes several impact-categories of the EU ETS on the dependent variables 
were identified. Once all cases were examined, the cross-case analysis including pattern-
matching techniques was applied in order to illuminate common outcomes, while paying 
attention to rival explanations, thereby increasing the internal validity of the presented results. 
As concerns about validity and reliability are omnipresent in qualitative research, the next 
sub-section will address these in greater detail.  
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4.4.  Validity and Reliability 
Considering the necessity of research to exhibit logically comprehensive and coherent 
explanations and descriptions, its quality is judged via logical tests. The most commonly used 
tests to assess the quality of empirical social research relate to construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 2009). This section will address the 
implications of these tests and provide insights as to how this research remedies the issues 
concerning its quality.  
Concerning construct validity, which describes the appropriateness of operational measures of 
the concepts under investigation (Kidder & Judd, 1986), especially case studies are prone to 
criticism regarding the subjective nature of data collection and insufficiently operationalized 
measures (Yin, 2009). Although the measures, as identified and operationalized throughout 
the theoretical section of this work, are well-founded in theory, the precision with which they 
can be documented is not perfect. Yin (2009), however, identifies remedies to this issue, 
including the use of multiple sources of evidence, achieved via the inclusion of archival data 
as well as interviews in the data collection process, and the maintenance of a chain of 
evidence.  
A further test, which has important implications for explanatory case studies (Yin, 2009), is 
concerned with a study´s internal validity. That is whether the aim of establishing causal 
relationships can be met without fallaciously identifying spurious relationships as causal ones 
(Kidder & Judd, 1986). The most relevant threat to internal validity is the omission of 
potential rival explanations and thereby relates to the general difficulty of making correct 
inferences (Yin, 2009). Even in the event that resources, such as time, were unlimited, to 
incorporate every potential, rival explanation in any study would exceed the cognitive 
capacities of any researcher. However, the anticipation and incorporation of questions 
addressing rival explanations, the robustness of findings, and the convergence of evidence 
mark an important step in dealing with the difficulties of making correct inferences, and 
thereby remedying concerns about internal validity (ibid.). The pattern-matching strategy 
employed in the data analysis of this research and explained in the preceding sub-section, as 
well as the explicit account for rival explanations via the incorporation of context factors, both 
serve as tactics improving its internal validity, following recommendations made by Yin 
(2009) in this regard.  
The last validity test stems from concerns regarding the generalizability of a given study´s 
findings (Kidder & Judd, 1986). External validity in case study research is, unlike survey 
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research, a product of analytical generalization, which seeks to transfer certain results to a 
broader theory (Yin, 2009). By following the replication strategy, addressed at an earlier 
point, and testing whether the propositions of the employed theory hold in multiple cases for 
which that theory predicts such outcomes, this research employs the best available strategy for 
improving external validity (ibid.).  
In conclusion, the question of reliability remains. The reliability test refers to the possibility of 
repeating the steps of a given study, such as data collection and analysis, and to arrive at the 
same results (Kidder & Judd, 1986). According to Yin (2009), the desired goal of reliability is 
to curtail biases and mistakes. This research, in accordance with Yin´s (2009) 
recommendations, closely documents the steps carried out in order to allow for repetition. It 
furthermore utilizes case study protocols and relies on a database, thereby increasing 
reliability via the operationalization of as many processes as possible (ibid.). 
 
4.5.  Difficulties 
Several difficulties arose throughout this research. This section will address the most severe 
and important ones while referring to the stages at which they arose.  
One of the issues this research faced was the very limited population of relevant cases from 
the outset. As pointed out in sub-section 4.1, several reasons contributed to an initially small 
number of suitable cases. This circumstance was further aggravated by significant difficulties 
in gaining access to knowledgeable and cooperative interviewees. Although relevant 
companies were contacted via e-mail up to 5 times, and in cases in which telephone numbers 
were available also via phone, responses were only received from 9 of the 14 companies. This 
circumstance can possibly be attributed to the present language barrier, as the author does not 
speak the native language of the population under investigation. However, two companies 
explicitly declined to partake in this study, with one referring to internal rules on the 
participation in research, and the other not specifying any reasons for declining. Other 
respondents who ultimately did not partake in the study were either unable to identify the 
organizational unit responsible for handling the request, ceased contact after initial 
introduction of the project, or considered themselves unsuitable for participation based on the 
official´s perceptions of company irrelevance to studies linked to innovation activity. 
Although this remains speculation, it appears reasonable to assume that a number of non-
respondents may have had similar reasons for ignoring all efforts to establish contact. 
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Another important issue arose concerning sensitive and particularly confidential information 
about companies´ strategies. Despite efforts such as non-disclosure agreements, this 
circumstance contributed to certain questions yielding unreliable answers, or none at all. For 
example, when asked which role emissions trading assumed in the respective organization, 
one official replied that company management had advised her not to speak about the topic. In 
connection to this problem, interviews were not recorded and the author agreed to anonymize 
gathered data and results in order to disable any ex-post identification of specific companies 
or interviewees. To this end it was also necessary to omit explicit mentions of certain 
products, technologies, product-categories, or examined sectors. The reconciliation of 
information provided in section 4.1 with the European Union Transaction Log and the 
presented findings could enable the identification of specific firms, and thereby put the author 
at risk of a breach of contract. 
Despite the mentioned efforts of increasing trustworthiness and conceding anonymity to 
interviewees, several instances arose in which questions were answered in what could be 
characterized as an evasive manner. This circumstance can possibly be attributed to 
interviewees´ efforts to protect or even embellish the public image of their employer in 
relation to environmental consciousness and responsibility.  
Lastly, in some instances, the language barrier between the author and the respondents 
remained problematic to the extent that some questions as well as answers needed additional 
clarification. Moreover, in very few instances, respondents identified themselves as incapable 
or unqualified to answer certain questions, which in turn remained unanswered as limitations 
in time and capacity did not allow for follow-up interviews with responsible or 
knowledgeable units. This final issue was especially pronounced in relation to questions 
concerning the role of emissions trading and/or research and development activity, which 
especially in the case of multinational companies tends to be centralized in global 
headquarters or innovation centers.  
 
5. Findings 
5.1. Research, Development and Demonstration 
The majority of investigated firms engage in some form of RD&D activities. As was 
expected, the extent and direction of these efforts differ across firms and sectors. All firms 
active in RD&D appear to engage in all three RD&D components primarily in the quest for 
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innovations. Process innovations, on the other hand, only involve all three RD&D 
components in manufacturing industries, while the remaining firms were not found to engage 
in basic laboratory research. A pattern emerged that product innovations were more 
commonly researched, developed, and demonstrated in firms from manufacturing industries, 
which also belong to the smaller-size operations represented in the sample. Process 
innovations were developed and/or demonstrated in all firms active in RD&D, but more 
pronounced in utilities firms, which belong to the larger-size operations represented in the 
sample.  
While it is true that some component of RD&D could be found in most investigated firms, its 
extent should not be overstated, especially in relation to process innovations. This is 
exemplified by companies that, since the introduction of the EU ETS, have started employing 
technologies new to their operations, which, although they require some extent of 
development to match company-specific circumstances, and certainly constitute 
demonstration on the company level, are to be located closer to the adoption dimension, 
which will be examined in the succeeding sub-section. 
Nevertheless, one specific area of increased RD&D efforts was to be found in carbon capture 
and storage (CCS). Albeit not relevant for all investigated firms, and even incompatible with 
the operations of some, RD&D efforts in CCS were found in some firms. CCS, which 
describes the technique of capturing CO2 with its subsequent storage underground, is of 
particular interest with a view to the EU ETS, and has been described as “one of the key 
technological mitigation options” (Rogge et al., 2011).  
Relying on the applied definition of eco-innovation, all RD&D efforts mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs are directly related to the environmental performance of the examined 
firms. However, as established throughout section 3, such findings say nothing about the 
underlying drivers of these efforts, and do not address the reasons for firms´ diverse 
approaches.  
Generally, RD&D efforts were found to be impacted by the EU ETS to varying degrees in all 
investigated firms. Surprisingly, even firms that due to freely allocated allowances exceeding 
annual emissions did not experience any direct cost associated with the system, appeared to 
have carried out, or at least considered, RD&D efforts in product and/or process innovations 
resulting in decreased CO2 emissions. While many company officials remained careful 
attributing these efforts directly to the EU ETS or identifying the instrument as their sole 
driver, all identified a regulatory push/pull effect. Most pronounced RD&D effects were 
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found in relation to CCS, mirroring findings by Cames (2010) and Rogge et al. (2011), with 
one company official (Case #5) stating that “CCS will be the next hot topic in the industry”.  
Although a regulatory push/pull effect on RD&D activity was found, context factors appear to 
play equally decisive roles in these considerations. All investigated companies identified at 
least one factor aside from the EU ETS as equally or more decisive in shaping decisions 
regarding RD&D. Such include savings via reduced fuel consumption, pressures from local 
communities and the public salience of climate change, environmental consciousness of top-
management, and other environmental policies. Concerning the policy mix, the Industrial 
Emissions Directive33 (IED), the Energy Efficiency Directive34 (EED), and the Renewable 
Energy Directive35 (RED) were found to be less influential than the EU ETS, if having any 
impact at all. None of the investigated firms attributed any pronounced influence to domestic 
legislation. 
In relation to the observed pattern of some firms being more likely to invest in RD&D 
directed at product innovation, while other firms appear to put a stronger emphasis on process 
innovations, it appears reasonable to conclude that factors other than the policy mix are 
decisive. Since all observed companies are subject to the same environmental legislation, 
inter-firm differences are likely to stem either from firm heterogeneity or varying market 
conditions, such as firm size and market structure. This notion finds support in the findings of 
inter alia Link (1982) and Scherer (1983). In agreement with the findings of Link (1982), this 
study finds that the share of R&D directed at process innovations appears to be positively 
related to market concentration. Additionally, the observed firms operating in more 
concentrated markets are larger in size than their counterparts. Scherer (1983) and Cohen and 
Klepper (1996) find that resources devoted to R&D in process innovations tend to increase 
with firm size, providing further support for the conclusion that inter-firm differences related 
to innovation types are mainly related to context factors.  
 
                                                            
33 EU (2010, December 17). “Directive 2010/75/EU”. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32010L0075&from=EN (28.06.2017). 
34 EU (2012, November 14). “Directive 2012/27/EU”. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012L0027&from=EN (28.06.2017). 
35 EU (2009, June 5). “Directive 2009/28/EC”. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009L0028&from=EN (28.06.2017). 
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5.2. Adoption of Eco-Innovations 
While findings on the policy instrument´s impact on RD&D are few, and rather mixed, the 
adoption dimension of innovation was found to be more fruitful in terms of evidence, which 
in turn generated more straightforward results.  
Four of five investigated firms have invested in new facilities or the retrofitting of existing 
facilities since the introduction of the EU ETS. Retrofits, as well as the construction of new 
facilities, were found to be directly related to the environmental performance of the respective 
firms throughout. While the nature of the adopted technology varied to a certain degree, 
depending on the respective operations of the examined firms, some patterns emerged. 
All firms found to invest in new facilities exhibited a focus on renewable sources of energy. 
Several projects were identified which committed sizeable investments to, inter alia, solar 
energy plants, bio-mass plants, and alternative fuels facilities. Besides CCS, these measures 
exhibit the most obvious connection to the EU ETS, and contribute considerably to the 
decrease of CO2 emissions. Retrofits to existing facilities were found to be more diverse, 
ranging from modernization efforts due to age or wear to conscious abatement efforts. 
Nevertheless, all retrofits appeared to contribute to reduced emission levels.  
In comparison to RD&D efforts, adoption measures were more conclusively found to be 
related to the EU ETS. This finding appears especially true for investments in new facilities. 
As one company official stated (Case #5), “These [facilities] were both triggered by EU 
legislation. These projects only make sense when taking into account the CO2 price”, also 
assuring that: “We [the company] had no interest in alternative fuels before we became part 
of the EU ETS”. Another (Case #3) identified the EU ETS´s influences as “not marginal” in 
relation to adoption measures. Other company officials (Case #2) posited that adoption 
measures´ “main targets are CO2 emissions”, further underlining the EU ETS´s impact on 
these. Although the EU ETS was found to be the main driver of investments in this direction, 
the influence of the RED with respect to facilities for the sourcing of renewable energy cannot 
be ignored.  
Turning to retrofits to existing facilities, motivations are more diverse, but remain supportive 
of the assertion that the EU ETS has exerted additional pressures in the direction of their 
adoption. While retrofits were often labeled as efficiency-enhancing measures, one company 
official´s (Case #2) statement that “energy efficiency and CO2 emissions are directly 
connected” is an important assertion. When asked whether such efficiency-enhancing retrofits 
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would have taken place regardless of the consideration of CO2, another official from the same 
firm replied: “I think yes, but it would take a bit longer”. Nevertheless, it appears that the EU 
ETS serves more of a complementary role to the IED and EED with a view to retrofits and 
modernizations, as compared to the construction of new facilities. One company official notes 
that although (Case #3) “there is a lot of overlap, the IED was probably most decisive”.  
Generally, the findings on adoption suggest that the broader EU-level policy mix has had a 
significant impact on the investment strategies of regulated firms, with the EU ETS playing a 
considerable role with a view to long-term returns. As one official (Case #2) puts it: “If it 
weren´t for the EU regulatory framework, we would not have implemented these changes at 
the same pace”. 
Adoption decisions appear to have been influenced to a far lesser extent by context factors 
other than the EU policy mix, as compared to RD&D efforts. While differences in chosen 
technologies certainly mirror the heterogeneity of investigated firms, adoption strategies 
appear to be a rather uniform response to regulation. Decision patterns to diversify technology 
portfolios away from fossil fuels were found to be largely informed by long-term 
considerations of the impacts of environmental regulation, including the EU ETS. However, 
the public acceptance of renewable energy sources, customer demand for environmentally 
friendly services and products, as well as long-term competitiveness considerations and a 
general proactivity of firms were identified as facilitating factors to varying degrees.  
 
5.3. Organizational Change 
The final innovation dimension, organizational change, encompasses operational change, 
procedural change, structural change, and changes in corporate vision. The impacts of the EU 
ETS differ across these categories, and are often complemented or triggered by context 
factors rather than the policy instrument under examination.  
In terms of operational changes, all investigated firms were found to have altered operational 
processes in favor of environmental performance. All firms applied at least one such change, 
including fuel substitution, the substitution or reduction of certain input factors in the 
respective production process and operational fuel saving techniques. However, the EU ETS 
was not found to be the main driver of such process innovations. The instrument did serve a 
complementary function due to additional cost savings in most cases, especially with a view 
to long-term costs. “Yes, but they are becoming more and more important now that CO2 is an 
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additional cost factor” one official (Case #2) stated, when asked whether fuel and raw 
material substitution had been important strategies before the introduction of the EU ETS.  
Currently operational changes appear to be more decisively influenced by various context 
factors. No clear pattern emerged, making it unfeasible to generalize. The following quotes 
will exemplify the diverse findings in this respect. One official (Case #1) responded: “Again, 
the price of emissions is not that high … the deciding factor is, however, fuel prices”, when 
asked about the main motivation behind fuel saving techniques. Another (Case #3), while 
speaking about the substitution of liquid fuels with gas, attributed more importance to the 
IED, saying: “[We substitute fuel] because of SO2 and NOx and particle matters, other 
pollutants [than CO2] … The IED was more decisive in the fuel substitution than the EU 
ETS”. It appears reasonable to conclude that a mix of various factors contribute to the 
widespread application of operational innovations. 
Turning to procedural changes, a different picture emerged. While yet again all investigated 
firms were found to have undergone procedural innovations to some degree, these were found 
to have been determined by the EU ETS to a considerably larger extent than was the case with 
operational changes. For one, since the introduction of the EU ETS, CO2 was found to play a 
far more significant role in the risk management of all investigated companies. One company 
official (Case #4) states: “Emissions are included in risk management, which was not the case 
before”. Another interviewee (Case #5) goes into further detail when asked whether CO2 is 
included in the firm´s risk management, responding: “Yes. Even in day-to-day business. We 
are practically calculating per contract … [whether we are] able to cover opportunity costs of 
not selling CO2 [allowances] that is [are] required to cover production”. Secondly, the 
investment strategies of most investigated companies were found to be impacted by the EU 
ETS considerably. As one company official (Case #1) states, “It has definitely changed our 
way of thinking and our strategy. It changed our priorities in terms of investment … It forced 
us to include additional variables in our calculations”. When asked about the influence of the 
EU ETS on investment strategies, another interviewee (Case #2) posits: “[The carbon price] 
has influenced our decisions regarding all new projects. We prepare these calculations and 
our plan is to include this into the decision-making procedure”. Generally, the EU ETS and 
the associated price for carbon appear to be reflected in the strategic decisions of investigated 
firms. Conversely, sustainability strategies were found to be impacted by the EU ETS to a 
much lesser extent. While some interviewees identified an increase in emphasis on climate 
change since the introduction of the EU ETS, context factors were found to be more relevant 
in this respect. The public salience of climate change, pressures from local communities, and 
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customer demands proved most important in this regard, with top-management commitment 
and environmental proactivity further benefiting the increased attention paid to climate 
change and related sustainability questions.  
Concerning structural change, the effects of the EU ETS were found to be limited. With few 
exceptions, the investigated companies had not introduced any new organizational units or 
task forces in response to the EU ETS. Presumably in order to keep compliance costs at an 
acceptable level, previously existing units´ responsibilities were simply extended in most 
cases. “We did not make big organizational changes, we just added additional tasks” one 
respondent (Case #3) stated, with another (Case #4) saying: “Not so much fundamental 
changes, but a bolstering of existing structures”, when asked whether the EU ETS had 
provoked structural changes in their respective organizations.  
Turning to changes in corporate vision, findings are diverse. While all investigated firms 
exhibit varying degrees of commitment to sustainability and environmental responsibility, the 
influence of the policy instrument covers a wide range. Since all investigated firms have 
environmental and/or energy management systems in place, and devote large sections of their 
annual and/or sustainability reports, and/or websites to questions of sustainability and 
environmental protection, including climate change, it can be concluded that a certain level of 
environmental awareness and sense of responsibility is present across the sample. However, 
whether the EU ETS has provoked an increased focus on these issues cannot be answered 
uniformly for the chosen sample. While some firms appear to have picked up on questions of 
environmental protection only after the introduction of the EU ETS, with one representative 
(Case #1) stating: “It made us realize that we are impacting the environment. I´m sure, if 
there was no ETS, there would be no ISO 1400136 [environmental management standard], 
which is our voluntary choice”, others acknowledged that the instrument increased the 
perceived importance of these issues in their respective firms, but insisted that other factors, 
such as the public salience of climate change, the proactivity of top-level management, or 
local community pressures, had directed attention towards environmental issues long before 
the introduction of the EU ETS. Such claims seem credible, since the firms in question were 
found to have implemented, for instance, environmental management systems or voluntary 
emission reduction targets before the announcement was made that the EU ETS would 
become operational in the Republic of Croatia. It can then be said that context factors appear 
                                                            
36 See https://www.iso.org/iso-14001-environmental-management.html (26.06.2017). 
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to play a decisive role in shaping corporate vision on environmental responsibility, with the 
EU ETS mostly playing a marginal or complementary role.  
 
5.4. Discussion 
Having presented the main findings, the following sub-section will recap the results, go into 
more detail concerning the relative influence of various explanatory variables, and present 
some additional findings. While the qualitative nature of this study does not enable a 
quantitative interpretation, it appears that the EU ETS has exerted additional pressures in the 
direction of eco-innovation, thereby confirming that a regulatory push/pull effect is present. 
However, the findings also suggest that the EU ETS´s influence remains weak in some 
aspects, and that context factors have played an important role. 
 
5.4.1. Innovation Impact 
The findings presented in the preceding section show that eco-innovation can be detected in 
all firms represented in the sample. However, they also show that impact of the EU ETS 
exhibits considerable variation across innovation dimensions and between firms.  
The level of observed RD&D was low. While manufacturing firms appear to engage in 
RD&D to a larger extent, the EU ETS does not appear to have triggered such efforts. For one, 
manufacturers are striving to differentiate their product portfolios in order to gain competitive 
advantages, and although it is true that certain RD&D efforts are aimed at the reduction of 
CO2 emissions in order to reduce compliance costs and offer competitive product pricing, the 
identified importance of context factors suggests that these efforts are merely being reinforced 
by the EU ETS, rather than triggered or even made worthwhile. With a view to service 
providers and utilities firms, RD&D efforts were found to be minimal. While the company-
level demonstration of new technology was found to be widespread, such efforts should not 
be overstated in the strict sense of RD&D, since the applied technologies have been 
researched, developed and demonstrated before, rendering their application more of an 
adoption phenomenon. It is to be kept in mind that RD&D is costly, and that uncertainties 
surrounding its outcome are very likely to hamper any such efforts. It therefore appears that 
the market failures surrounding this dimension are not easily cured by the EU ETS, especially 
considering the still low carbon price and the not unsubstantial share of free allocation to be 
found in the Republic of Croatia. Nevertheless, CCS was found to be an important area of 
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RD&D. Although not widespread yet, it is reasonable to assume that it will gain attractiveness 
if compliance costs increase.  
The adoption of new, eco-friendly technologies showed more widespread than RD&D. 
Simultaneously, the EU ETS´s influence was found to be more pronounced in this dimension, 
especially with a view to the construction of new facilities aimed at the sourcing of renewable 
energy. The EU ETS was found to have complemented a number of context factors here. 
Although the carbon price remains low, the expectations surrounding climate policy, 
including the EU ETS, play an important role in decisions surrounding this adoption category. 
However, the influence of especially the public acceptance of renewable energy sources and 
the RED cannot be neglected. When looking at retrofits, the EU ETS´s impact was found to 
be slightly more limited. While additional savings from efficiency increases might have 
exerted positive influence on retrofit decisions, the IED and EED were identified as most 
decisive in this category of the adoption dimension. 
Finally, organizational change was found to be the most widespread. The findings suggest that 
operational changes were caused by context factors to a large extent, with the IED and fuel 
prices being the most decisive. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the EU ETS provided 
additional impetus for some of these changes. Procedural changes, with the exception of 
modified sustainability strategies, exhibited the most pronounced impact of the EU ETS. The 
instrument appears to introduce the issue of climate change to higher management levels via 
the inclusion of carbon-related variables in investment decisions. Structural change was 
scarce, most likely resulting from desires to keep compliance at low levels. Lastly, observed 
vision changes seem to be largely influenced by context factors, such as local community 
pressures and public salience of climate change. However, it is reasonable to conclude that 
long-term international climate targets play a significant role in shaping corporate vision. As 
such, the EU ETS can be considered to bolster the credibility of such commitments, thereby 
contributing indirectly to vision changes.  
 
5.4.2. EU ETS Features 
In determining the influence, or lack thereof, of the EU ETS, it is worth revisiting some of the 
findings which emerged throughout the qualitative interviews regarding the two main design 
features of the policy instrument.  
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In terms of stringency, which was operationalized as compliance cost, the findings suggest 
that the EU ETS does not impose any sizeable cost on regulated entities. All interviewees´ 
accounts match in this aspect. Clearly the low carbon price, the free allocation of allowances 
to varying extents, and in some instances an interplay with still recovering target markets and 
consequently reduced output levels, are factors which contribute to this circumstance. Quotes 
such as: “As a change motivator? Allowances have been hovering between 5 and 8 Euros, 
now being around 5-ish. To tell you the truth, this is not enough to motivate any company to 
undertake drastic changes. The expense per customer or per year is not a big deal. Heavy 
modifications cost more” (Case #2) or “We spend more money on plastic cups [than on EU 
ETS compliance]” (Case #1) are fairly clear indicators.  
Turning to the predictability of the instrument, a similarly negative picture emerged. Short 
trading phases, frequent changes in legislation, the cumbersome process of determining the 
rules for subsequent phases, and the associated late arrival of definitive information on those 
rules were all cited as reasons for the low levels of predictability all respondents ascribed to 
the policy instrument. As one company official (Case #3) stated, “It is unpredictable, as can 
be seen now with the process of defining the rules for Phase 4”. Another (Case #5) notes that 
“We have never been able to even closely predict the CO2 price. Also, there is big uncertainty 
about what will happen post 2020. We do not know how the allocation of allowances will be 
calculated, what the benchmarking rules will look like, and so on”. In connection to these 
issues another interviewee, when asked whether these uncertainties defer investments in new 
technology aimed at abatement, responded with a firm “Yes”.  
These findings beg the question, if the EU ETS is neither stringent, nor predictable, how can it 
have induced innovation activity? Simply put, the findings suggest that the expectations 
related to the future of the policy instrument have had a decisive effect. While some firms 
already experience added cost via the carbon price, which explains the observed price-induced 
innovation activity to some degree, recent climate policy, and thereby the EU ETS, appear to 
have signaled strong political commitment to long-term carbon reduction goals. In 
combination with various context factors, this has caused the inclusion of carbon prices in 
corporate strategy, which in turn has spurred first forays into the development or application 
of novel abatement technology, such as CCS, the demonstration of renewable energy sources, 
and the adoption of a number of low-cost abatement strategies such as fuel substitution. 
“Analysts say that until the year 2020 the price of allowances will be around 24 Euros, and 
then it is a completely different ballgame” one company official (Case #1) stated in relation to 
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the expected future impact of the instrument, a sentiment closely mirrored by other firms 
represented in the chosen sample.  
In conclusion, it can be said that most interviewees were sure that increased carbon prices, 
and a decrease in freely allocated allowances, would force their respective organizations to 
tackle GHG emissions more aggressively. Additionally, the extension of the length of trading 
phases, and even more so the earlier announcement of definitive rules, would enable an 
investment environment more conducive of eco-innovation. This finding lends support to 
theoretical implications and earlier conclusions, that a further tightening of stringency and 
especially enhanced predictability would improve the capacity of the instrument to foster low-
carbon innovation. 
 
5.4.3. Firm-External Factors 
Turning to firm-external context factors, several categories were determined to influence the 
investment and innovation activities of the examined firms. Depending on the innovation 
dimension and firm-characteristics, these factors were found to be varyingly decisive, ranging 
from no detected impact to more influential than the policy intervention.  
Firstly, the policy mix was found to be highly influential. While RD&D efforts remained 
largely unaffected by the EU-level policy mix, both adoption and organizational change, 
especially operational change, were subject to considerable influence from the IED and EED, 
and to a lesser extent from the RED. This finding appears reasonable, since the IED prescribes 
the mitigation of certain pollutants under threat of facility closure. Similarly, the EED has a 
rather prescriptive character as compared to the EU ETS. “It is definitely the entire EU policy 
mix that contributes” one official (Case #3) stated in relation to this. The RED was found to 
have played a significant role in the adoption of renewable energy sources only. It is, 
however, to be kept in mind that there is significant overlap with the EU ETS when it comes 
to the employment of renewable sources of energy and efficiency-enhancing measures. 
Domestic policies were found to play no significant role in the innovation activity of the 
observed firms. When asked, for instance, about the scheme for the support of renewables, 
one company official (Case #5) stated: “The government does not have enough funds to cover 
the contracts they sign”. Similarly, another respondent (Case #2) stated: “It is not very clear 
what the vision of the national authorities is. It is more stable to look at the EU policies. More 
reliable than Croatian legislation”, when asked about the influence of national legislation. 
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Secondly, market factors were determined to have been influential with regard to adoption 
and organizational change, especially in the operational and vision categories. For one, fuel 
prices appear to have influenced a number of decisions in both innovation dimensions, 
although to a larger extent in the operational category of organizational change. It is also to be 
kept in mind that certain market circumstances may have oppressed the implementation of 
changes in some firms. Regarding such instances, one company official (Case #5) stated: 
“Market factors are very important. Using bio-mass, for example, is simply not feasible”, 
referring to the high transportation costs. Next, concerns about competitive pricing of goods 
and services posed an influential factor in businesses where the added cost of emissions had 
the potential to cut a supplier out from a highly competitive market. Moreover, customer 
demand for eco-friendly services was identified to have a considerable impact on some firms. 
Two of the examined companies, however, were found to experience absolutely no demand-
pull in the direction of eco-innovation. As one company (Case #4) representative put it: “I am 
afraid our customers do not care about that. We are having a hard time marketing products 
with lower CO2 footprints”. 
Lastly, public salience and local community pressures were found to influence both adoption 
and organizational change. In terms of adoption, it appears that the public salience of climate 
change and the public acceptance of renewables contributed to investment decisions 
concerning especially the construction of new facilities aimed at the sourcing of renewable 
energy. In terms of retrofits, these social influences were found to be weaker, although in 
some instances, pressures from local communities had urged the application of new 
technologies or the discontinuation of certain others. With regard to organizational change, 
the public salience of climate change and environmental protection was found to have had 
impacts mostly on the vision of examined companies, contributing to increased awareness of 
and regard for environmental issues, including climate change.  
 
5.4.4. Firm-Internal Factors 
Similar to firm-external context factors, firm-internal context factors were found to show 
differential impacts across innovation dimensions, and were determined to exhibit varying 
degrees of importance in relation to the facilitation or impediment of innovation.  
With respect to firm characteristics, it is important to note that the sector a company belongs 
to determines its predisposition for certain technologies, processes, and products. With firm 
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heterogeneity, the feasibility and applicability of certain technologies and practices varies 
across the chosen sample, restraining the available scope of action for each individual case. 
For instance, CCS was not a feasible option for all investigated firms. Moreover, differences 
in respective markets, for instance market concentration, international competition, or demand 
for eco-friendly goods or services were identified, and deemed to decrease or increase the 
radius of operation in terms of innovation, depending on the individual firm´s characteristics. 
For example, firms which operated in highly competitive markets, subject to international 
competitive pressures, showed a greater concern for the added cost of the EU ETS than firms 
in concentrated markets. Although these influences strictly fall into the firm-external category 
of context factors, this goes to show that their impact varies depending on which sector the 
firm belongs to.  
Turning to the firm-internal determinants of innovation featured in the research framework, 
firm size was determined to play a role mostly in relation to the differentiation between 
product and process innovation, with larger firms exhibiting less tendencies of product 
innovation than smaller firms. Another finding related to size is that smaller firms appeared to 
have less resources at their disposal for innovation activity. Quotes such as: “In the end, if you 
don´t have the money for it, you cannot do it [acquire low-carbon technology]” (Case #1) and 
“The initiative [a CCS project] did not get approval, we didn´t get funds” (Case #5) 
exemplify this circumstance.  
Concerning corporate vision and environmental proactivity, it was found that all investigated 
firms had made credible commitments to sustainability and environmental protection. These 
commitments certainly facilitate an increased rate of the development and application of low-
carbon technologies and practices. While the special emphasis some interviewees put on the 
impact of the environmental awareness and proactivity of their respective firms relative to 
policy intervention, and some of the more influential context factors, should be viewed with 
caution, it is clear, that companies have internalized environmental issues, and are aware that 
business-as-usual scenarios will not be feasible in the future. This corporate appreciation of 
the realities of environmental responsibility exerts positive influence on the decision-making 
process regarding eco-innovation.  
Lastly, the firms´ geographical locations made them more or less susceptible to pressures 
from local communities. Firms located in densely populated areas exhibited a more proactive 
stance in abatement, and appeared more understanding of the necessity of an aggressive 
approach to environmental issues.  
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6. Conclusion 
The analysis of emissions-intensive business operators in the Republic of Croatia has shown 
that innovation activities are being carried out across multiple innovation dimensions, 
influenced by a multitude of innovation determinants. Although context factors were found to 
still play significant roles in this respect, the EU ETS appears to have evolved into a powerful 
part of the integrated climate and innovation policy mix aimed at the decarbonization of 
European economies. The following paragraphs will sum up the findings and outline some of 
their implications. 
In essence, the fundamental economic proposition for the EU ETS works. It has established a 
price for GHG emissions, which has come to be reflected in multiple areas of the corporate 
decision making of regulated entities, and thereby influences investment and innovation 
activity. In this sense, the EU ETS should be considered an important advance in international 
climate policy. The findings have confirmed that the instrument exerts a regulatory push/pull 
effect in the direction of eco-innovation, which is especially pronounced with a view to 
procedural organizational change and the re-orientation of technology portfolios towards 
renewable energy sources. While induced product innovations are rare, process innovations 
have been fostered to a considerable extent by the instrument. Nevertheless, the generous 
application of free allocation in the Republic of Croatia, paired with the remaining low 
allowance price, hinders the instrument to unfold its full innovation-inducing potential. 
Although the design features of the EU ETS were found to be sub-par, with low levels of 
predictability and moderate stringency, expectations surrounding the instrument´s future, 
coupled with the perceived strong political commitment to increasingly strict climate policy, 
complement the hitherto modest price-induced effects.  
The findings of this study largely mirror earlier results by the likes of Cames (2010) and 
Rogge et al. (2011), amongst others. Low-cost and low-risk compliance solutions still enjoy 
preference to extensive RD&D efforts associated with high risks and cost. Furthermore, low 
carbon prices remain an obstacle. However, in contrast to these earlier studies, corporate 
focus on renewables and the associated mobilization of sizeable investments were found to be 
more pronounced. Also, and somewhat surprisingly, this study does not detect any significant 
influence of domestic policies on the innovation activities of the examined firms, but 
concludes that the EU policy mix is of paramount importance in this regard.  
Although findings support the theoretical propositions that emissions trading and the 
associated change in factor prices, or at least the expectation thereof, induce innovation, it 
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seems clear that environmental policy needs to be supported by policies aimed specifically at 
innovation, if the ambitious climate targets are to be met. On the EU level this necessity 
appears to have been acknowledged, since the EU Commission has put forward a proposal for 
the revision of the EU ETS including an innovation fund37. On the domestic level, the policies 
in place do not seem to achieve the desired effects and should be revised accordingly. The 
reasons for the inefficacy of domestic policies and concrete suggestions for their 
improvements would, however, require new research.  
Concerning potential improvements of the design features of the EU ETS, it is reasonable to 
assume that the gradual decrease of the allowance budget and the increase of auctioning as an 
allocation mechanism will cure the issues associated with the low allowance price, and 
consequently the instrument´s stringency. It should be kept in mind that the pace of this 
process cannot be accelerated arbitrarily, since, in order to avoid large economic disruptions, 
regulated entities require ample adjustment time. The predictability of the instrument, 
however, could be enhanced considerably by expanding the duration of trading phases on the 
one hand, and on the other by ensuring the early announcement of new rules. Such 
improvements would contribute significantly to a more stable investment environment, 
provide regulated entities with the necessary adjustment time, and enable the reconciliation of 
planning and investment horizons with the arrival of new rules. 
This thesis is not without limitations, warranting further research. The study was focused on 
one country, and while companies from different sectors were included, the small sample size 
did not allow for an in-depth comparative analysis of cross-sectoral impacts. Future research 
should include multiple countries and expand the sample size in order to enable a comparative 
analysis between countries as well as sectors. Furthermore, continued research should pay 
attention to a multitude of actors, rather than focusing only on the regulated entities, as such 
an inclusion of technology providers and consumers could prove beneficial. 
                                                            
37 EU (16 January 2017). “Finance for innovation: Towards the ETS Innovation Fund”. Retrieved from 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/finance-innovation-towards-ets-innovation-fund_en (29.06.2017). 
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